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I. INTRODUCTION
I thank Larry Alexander for organizing the workshop on the self-defense
portion of my manuscript entitled Just War Theory: Self-Defense, Necessity,
and the Ethics of Armed Conflict at the University of San Diego, where
the manuscript to which I respond here was presented.1  I have meanwhile 
decided to turn the manuscript into two books, the first provisionally being
entitled Self-Defense, Necessity, and Punishment; and the second, Modern
Just War Theory. 
* © Uwe Steinhoff.  Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and Public 
Administration at the University of Hong Kong. 
1. Funding was provided by the University of Hong Kong, with one gap being 
closed by Larry Alexander.  I also wish to offer thanks to the secretaries on both sides, that
is, to Trang Pham in San Diego and to May Yim in Hong Kong. 
 469


















   
 
 
   
 
 
     
    
 
   
 




Many philosophers who write on self-defense tend to ignore the self-
defense discussions offered by legal scholars, and accordingly they often
ignore the law or pay insufficient attention to it.  In my experience, this 
attitude stems from a misperception of legal scholarship as some kind of 
positivistic interpretation of legal documents and as positive law being 
irrelevant for deciding what the morally right answer to the issues raised
by self-defense are. I find this attitude deplorable because legal scholarship,
especially in the field of criminal law, is more often than not straightforward 
moral philosophy; and criminal law especially gives expression to widely
shared moral intuitions.  Thus, the price of ignoring the scholarly debate 
in criminal law about self-defense might be a certain parochialism wherein 
authors, who unnecessarily reinvent the stone wheel where others have
already offered a racing car wheel, entirely overlook problems that most
certainly would be worth of discussion,2 or misperceive the intuitions of
liberal philosophy professors for intuitions widely shared within one’s
community. 
Accordingly, I am particularly pleased to have been given the opportunity 
to discuss my views with a group of eminent legal scholars and, yes, 
philosophers, consisting of—in the order of my replies—Samuel C. Rickless, 
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Larry Alexander, Richard Arneson, Peter Westen— 
who contributed two papers—Alec Walen, Michael S. Moore, Saba Bazargan-
Forward, Douglas Husak, and Ken Simons.  I have greatly benefited from 
their comments and criticism.
II. REPLY TO RICKLESS
Samuel C. Rickless seems to think that almost every element in my
explication of the concept of self-defense is mistaken.3  Let us have a look: 
Rickless is right that, according to me, self-defense is directed against
violations of claim-rights.4 However, he is of the opinion that not just any
sort of claim right will do:
[I]f Jane initiates a threat of violation of my claim to property, then surely I do 
not engage in self-defense if I ward off this threat: what I engage in is defense of
my property, not defense of my self.  So, for Steinhoff’s account of self-defense to 
2. A good example is the subjective element of the self-defense justification,
which is virtually ignored in the recent philosophical literature on self-defense.  Of course, 
one can reject this element, but to do so one has to provide an argument, and to do that one 
would first have to realize there is indeed an open question to discuss. 
3. A previous version of the chapter Rickless criticizes is available at Uwe Steinhoff,
What is Self-Defense?, 29 PUB. AFF. Q. 385, 385–402 (2015) [hereinafter What is Self-
Defense].
4. See Uwe Steinhoff, Just War Theory: Self-Defense, Necessity, and the Ethics
of Armed Conflicts 22 (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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match our ordinary language intuitions, the kind of attack against which self-
defensive action is taken must be restricted to threatened or actual violation of a 
certain sort of claim, namely the kind of claim that protects interests that are tied
very closely to the person—existence, integrity, and freedom.5 
Actually, if we want to match ordinary language intuitions, we should
not confuse a reflexive pronoun with a combination of a possessive pronoun
and a noun. Ordinarily, people say and write “I defended myself,” not: “I
defended my self.” There is also nothing extraordinary about saying: I
defended myself against their attempt to damage my property.  Moreover, 
even if we talk about defending my self—unless Rickless has some
psychological, let us say Ericksonian or Meadian,6 sense of self in mind— 
my self is simply I: if you defend my self, you defend me. But if you can 
defend me—that is, my self—against other people’s attempts to steal my
property, as you surely can, then I can defend my self against such attempts. 
Moreover, it is not clear why Rickless allows for defense of “the kind 
of claim that protects interests that are tied very closely to the person.”7  It
is not immediately clear because it is called self-defense, not interests­
that-are-tied-very-closely-to-the-person-defense, and my integrity and 
freedom are not me—they are not my self.  The obvious reply is: Well, but
people would certainly harm your self—that is, you—if they cut off your
finger or falsely imprisoned you. That is true.  But, people would also harm 
my self—that is me—if they stole my money or damaged my property. Thus,
however you tweak or twist it, there is no basis for Rickless’s claim that
self-defense cannot apply to defense of property. Of course, I can defend 
myself against theft and robbery. That does fit ordinary language intuitions.  
I can also defend my self against theft and robbery.
However, German law thinks violations of mere contractual rights do 
not constitute an attack.8  Thus, if you, the milkman, decide not to deliver 
 5. Samuel C. Rickless, The Nature of Self-Defense 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 339, 
341–42 (2018).
6. Erickson was a psychoanalyst renowned for viewing identity formation as a 
process that is located both in the individual and the individual’s community. PING DETERS,
IDENTITY, AGENCY AND THE ACQUISITION OF PROFESSIONAL LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 38 
(2011). Mead is considered the founder of American social psychology and viewed the 
self as something that is continually produced through social interaction.  Id. at 40. 
7. Rickless, supra note 5, at 342. 
8. See Manfred Pieck, A Study of the Significant Aspects of German Contract Law, 
3 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 111, 126 (1996) (“If there are failures of performance
which do not constitute (1) delayed performance, (2) impossibility or inability to perform, 
(3) Fehlen or Wegfall der Geschaeftsgrundlage (non-existence or disappearance of the 
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the milk, that is not an attack.9  This makes a lot of sense for civil society,
but I think it also makes intuitive sense in the state of nature.  I do not think,
however, that there is one knock-down reason that accounts for this; there 
are, instead, overlapping concerns.  I have been silent on this issue in the
manuscript but will address it in the revised version. 
Rickless also takes issue with my claim that self-defense is limited to 
defense against ongoing or imminent attacks.10  Regarding my example of
a preacher drowning Billy the Baby during the baptism—which I think 
can hardly be described as an act of self-defense, even if the preacher
knows that Billy the Kid will kill him in the far future unless he drowns 
him now—Rickless begs to differ and asks: “[W]hat else could the preacher 
possibly plead except self-defense?”11  Well, under German law he could not 
possibly plead self-defense.12 He could, however, plead justifying emergency.13 
There is no such justifying emergency statute in the United States—their
necessity or choice of evils statutes are not the same—but that is a problem 
for U.S. law, not for my analysis.  To wit, many U.S. states do have an
imminence requirement for self-defense, and therefore, the most bizarre
interpretive acrobatics are necessary to get a woman off the hook in so-
called “battered women” cases.14  German commentators call these house
tyrant cases, and, thanks to the justifying emergency statute, they are in 
no need of any acrobatics.15 
Rickless also claims that during trial the preacher might say: “So, I 
figured that the only way to defend myself would be to kill Billy during the
baptism.”16  Well, he might say that, but it sounds strange.  He could just
as well, and less oddly, say: “I figured it was the only way to save my life.” 
There is a time-honored distinction between self-defense and self-preservation
one should not lose sight of.  Consider the following case: The preacher
hides from Billy the Kid under some trap door, where, it turns out, there 
basis of the contract), or (4) breaches of a warranty of fitness or a title defect, they are 
called positive Vertragsverletzungen (positive violations of contractual duty).”).
9. Unless, for example, you know that my survival or bodily integrity depends on 
it and you withhold it to kill me.
10. Rickless, supra note 5, at 342. 
11. Id.
 12. See STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGb] [PENAL CODE], § 32, translation at https://www.
gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p0171 [https://perma.cc/9HSZ­
WUXJ] (Ger.) (defining “self-defense”).
13. See id. § 34, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/
englisch_stgb.html#p0177 [https://perma.cc/R6KZ-3ZR5] (defining “necessity”). 
14. See Shana Wallace, Beyond Imminence: Evolving International Law and Battered 
Women’s Right to Self-Defense, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1749, 1749–51 (2004). 
15. See JAN ARNO HESSBRUEGGE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PERSONAL SELF-DEFENSE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 250 (2017); see also StGb § 34.
16. Rickless, supra note 5, at 343. 
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is also a baby.  The baby is about to cry, and if Billy hears that, he will find
and kill the preacher.  The preacher therefore covers the baby’s mouth and 
nose until it is unconscious—which would normally constitute battery. 
This is not a case of self-defense, certainly not in law.  The preacher has, 
however, a necessity justification here.  Now imagine a variation of this 
example where the baby in question is Billy the Baby himself, transported
through time by some cosmic fluke.  Would cutting off the baby’s air supply
now count as self-defense? I do not think so.  Self-defense is directed
against attackers, and it is Billy the Kid who is doing the attacking here, not
Billy the Baby.  The mere fact that Billy the Baby is an earlier time slice of 
Billy does not convert the baby into an attacker. If cutting off the first baby’s 
air supply was not self-defense, cutting Billy the Baby’s air supply is not 
self-defense either; it is self-preservation. 
Rickless also objects to my claim that self-defense can only be directed 
against attacks, that is, given how I understand “attack,” against rights-
violations stemming from action.17  He claims that one trapped in an elevator 
could act in self-defense against a butcher carrying a large knife who suddenly 
suffers muscle spasms such that the knife might end up in one’s body.18 
He adds: “The same would be true if the butcher’s primary motor cortex 
were being electrically stimulated by an evil neuroscientist.”19  In my view,
there is an attack in this latter case, with the neuroscientist being the attacker, 
but not in the case where the muscle spasms are not induced by anyone. 
Imagine, for instance, the butcher had some kind of electric cutting device
strapped to his back that suddenly goes haywire so that the knives threaten
to cut me into pieces.  Always prepared, I draw my light saber and destroy 
the device. I think it is odd to say I defended myself against the device.
Sure, I used force against it, but I might also forcibly open a door to escape 
a fire, and that does not mean I defended myself against the door—or against
the fire, for that matter. If, in contrast, the butcher activated the device 
to kill me, then my destroying the device would have been an act of self­
defense—not against the device but against the butcher.  In short, I do not 
think one can literally defend oneself against accidents, whether they come
in the form of malfunctioning devices or muscle spasms.  One can defend 
oneself against attacks, however. 
17. Id.
 18. Id. 
19. Id. 
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In this context, I must note that I follow Rudolph Carnap’s lead as far 
as conceptual explication is concerned.20  As I point out, Carnap requires
the explicatum of a concept to be similar—not equal—to its ordinary
language use, and to be precise, simple, and fertile.21  Rickless correctly surmises
I would not “think of conceptual analysis as involving replacement of a
Carnapian explicandum by a potentially rather dissimilar explicatum that
should be useful in empirical theorizing.”22  Instead, I think the explication 
of the concept of self-defense should also be fertile for normative theorizing 
—for example by making conceptual distinctions that have normative 
relevance—and this interest in fertility has to be weighed against the interest
in similarity.  Given that I think the butcher case falls under the justifying 
emergency justification and not the self-defense justification and given that it
is also weird in ordinary language—and at the very least not compelling 
—to say that I defend myself against the butcher’s involuntary movements, I
can safely stick with my explication of self-defense according to which it 
is directed against attacks. Pace Rickless, there is no “inconsistency.”23 
Moreover, my interest in fertility gives additional support to my insistence 
on the imminence requirement given that, as I argue, the distinction between
attacks that are ongoing or imminent and those that are not is normatively
relevant. 
Next, Rickless argues against my claim that self-defense need not be 
“aimed at averting or mitigating” harm.24  He attacks my example of the 
old gunfighter weary of life who secretly hopes to be killed by a young 
gunslinger but nevertheless fights back each time out of habit or professional 
ethics.25  I say the old gunfighter is defending himself although he does
not intend to avert harm.26 Rickless claims it would be “wildly irrational”
for the gunfighter to fight back if he intends to be killed.27  But because I 
nowhere say he intends to be killed but merely that he hopes to be killed, 
this is neither here nor there. 
Rickless also claims the gunfighter might still aim to avert “harm-tokens” 
instead of “harm-types.”28  I have argued elsewhere that it is not possible
to intend what I called “concrete singular actions,” that is actions that are 
specified down to the last detail—we cannot mentally and thus with our
 20. Id. at 1. 
21. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 21 n.44. 
22. Rickless, supra note 5, at 340 n.6. 
23. Id. at 344. 
24. Id. at 346. 
25. Id. at 346–47. 
26. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 6.
 27. Rickless, supra note 5, at 347. 
28. Id. 
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intentions so specify an action.29  For the same reasons, I do not think we 
can intend to avert harm-tokens. And, of course, I do not see why the gunfighter
should intend that anyway, as Rickless rightly points out.30  Yet Rickless 
says he is “not convinced that shooting at someone merely because one 
has been paid to do so or because it is habitual to do so under those sorts 
of circumstances automatically counts as self-defense.”31  He elaborates: 
“Certainly, we should be able to agree that if the gunslinger’s shooting back
was merely an elaborate signal to a confederate to leave town, it would not 
count as self-defense even if it resulted in the incapacitation of the gunslinger’s 
attacker and halted the attack.”32  Yet, in my example, the gunfighter “fights
back as competently and fiercely as he always does and indeed knows that
this will probably stop the attack,”33 and this is very different from signaling
to someone and then accidentally hitting an opponent.  Consider a parallel
example: Someone gives Alicia a loaded sniper rifle and tells her that if
she shoots from a lethal distance at Mircea’s head while she has it in her
cross-hairs, she will get $10,000, but only if she misses.  Whether or not 
she keeps the head in the cross-hairs can be closely monitored.  So, greedy
Alicia carefully aims the rifle and shoots, hoping she will miss anyway. 
She most certainly did not intend to inflict harm, for harming Mircea would 
be counter-productive.  Did she attack Mircea?  Of course.  Shooting at
someone’s head with a loaded sniper-rifle certainly is an attack, whether 
you intend to inflict harm or not.  But, if you can attack someone without 
intending to inflict harm, why should you not also be able to defend yourself
without the intention to avert harm?  Whence the mysterious difference?
If, let us say, Mircea knows he is protected by an impenetrable force field
that will reliably divert Alicia’s bullet but let his own phaser ray pass, and
intentionally stuns Alicia just as she is about to pull the trigger, then, it seems
to me, he has defended himself against an imminent attack by preventing it,
but he did not do so with the intention to avert harm—he already knew Alicia
could not harm him.
Rickless also has a problem with my idea that there can be unintentional 
self-defense, for example reflexive or instinctive self-defense.34  Commenting 
on my spider vs. spider wasp example he claims:
 29. UWE STEINHOFF, ON THE ETHICS OF WAR AND TERRORISM 40 (2007). 
30. Rickless, supra note 5, at 347–48. 
31. Id. at 348. 
32. Id.
 33. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 7.
 34. Rickless, supra note 5, at 349. 
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[O]ur descriptive predispositions in these cases are keyed to observable animal 
behavior.  And given that we generally take self-defense to involve intentions and
beliefs of certain sorts, the most reasonable explanation of our readiness to use 
the vocabulary of self-defense in describing the spider’s activity is that our application
of the concept of self-defense is analogical.  The use of self-defense vocabulary 
in this case seems no different from the use of words such as attempt and try to
describe the motion of sunflowers or light-sensitive bacteria.35 
I think this statement is both incoherent and entirely unrealistic.  If our
“descriptive predispositions in these cases are keyed to observable animal
behavior,” then it can hardly be a “given” that “we generally take self-defense
to involve intentions and beliefs of certain sorts.”36  I, for one, think the spider 
wasp is engaged in literal self-defense and so is a rat trying to bite the 
cat—whatever their “intentions” or “beliefs” might be.37 There is simply
no evidence concerning the language use of ordinary speakers—or narrators 
in animal documentaries—that would give the slightest credibility to Rickless’s 
claim that “we” use the term self-defense “analogical[ly]” in such cases.38 
Likewise, referring to another scenario,39 Rickless actually admits to “our 
readiness to describe Sally as engaging in self-defense when she punches 
Superman reflexively,” but then claims this is “no more than an instance 
of analogical concept application.”40  Yet, I think most of us are ready to 
describe Sally as engaging in literal self-defense—I certainly am—and
Rickless does not show otherwise.  Instead of taking the ordinary use of
“self-defense” seriously, Rickless seems to project his own technical use
of the term onto ordinary speakers, trying to explain away discrepancies
by an appeal to “analogical concept application.”41 
Rickless also considers my example where Sally is attacked by someone
whom she cannot stop from pushing his knife into her chest after exactly
twenty seconds.42  I argue that even if Sally knows that she cannot stop
him, her resistance would still count as self-defense, which would show
self-defense need not be aimed at averting or mitigating a harm nor at
averting or mitigating an attack.  Rickless basically criticizes the example 
by rejecting its assumptions.  He claims she does not have “knowledge that
she will fail to keep the knife away from her body: her assailant may, for 
all she knows, drop dead of a heart attack before he can press the knife 




 38. Id. (emphasis omitted).
39. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 8.
 40. Rickless, supra note 5, at 350.
 41. Id.
 42. Id.
 43. Id. at 351. 
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Yes, and “for all I know,” the desk I am sitting at might be a shapeshifting 
extraterrestrial anthropologist.  I think Rickless is confusing knowledge 
with certainty here.  Knowledge is commonly understood as justified true 
belief,44 and it is of course at least possible to have a justified true belief
and a firm conviction that your attacker is about to push a knife into your 
body in twenty seconds.  But, even then Sally’s resistance would intuitively 
still count as self-defense. However, Rickless thinks: 
Second, even supposing that Sally2 knows that she cannot possibly stop the 
assailant from stabbing her to death, she can still try to mitigate or avert the
stabbing. What she cannot do is rationally try to mitigate or avert the stabbing.
What this shows is not that intending to stop or mitigate an attack is impossible
when the victim knows that the intention will not be fulfilled, but that, under these 
circumstances, self-defense is irrational.45 
Let us suppose we have two Sally2s: Rational Sally2 and Irrational Sally2. 
On Rickless’s account, Rational Sally2’s resistance under these circumstances 
would not count as self-defense while Irrational Sally2’s would.  I find 
this bizarre. In addition, I do indeed think that it is not only rationally but 
conceptually impossible to intend to do something that you know you 
cannot do.  Consider the likelihood of this conversation:
Ernie: I know I cannot jump over the skyscraper, but I nevertheless 

intend to jump over it now. 

Bert: Nonsense, if you know that you cannot do it, you cannot 

simultaneously intend to. 

Ernie: But I am irrational. 

Bert: Geeeeeee, that is something completely different. Then of 

course you can intend to jump over the skyscraper although you
 
know you cannot jump over the skyscraper. 

I don’t think so. 
Moving on, I claim that: 
44. Justified true belief plus a variable X, to avoid Gettier problems.  Edmund L. 
Gettier, Is Justified Belief True Knowledge?, ANALYSIS, June 1963, at 121, 121.  But, that 
need not concern us. 
45. Rickless, supra note 5, at 351. 
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An act token is self-defense if and only if a) it is directed against an ongoing or
imminent attack, and b) the actor correctly believes that the act token is an
effective form of resistance or the act token belongs to an act type that usually
functions as a means to resist an attack.46 
Rickless thinks the reference to the act type that usually functions as a
means to resist an attack is ad hoc, but he actually seems to have a problem 
with the entire condition (b) and thinks it is open to counter-examples.47 
He uses his example of Sally3, who mistakes a harmless rock for Kryptonite
and ineffectively waves it in front of Superman’s face, and states: “[O]n
Steinhoff’s explication, Sally3’s actions are not self-defensive.  First, Sally3 
does not correctly believe that waving the rock in front of Superman’s face 
is an effective form of resistance, and second, the act type of rock-waving­
in-front-of-a-face does not usually function as a means to resist an attack.”48 
First, if someone throws a hand grenade into a classroom full of school 
children and intends to kill them all, then his act is certainly murderous,
even if the grenade does not go off.  It is murderous because he attempted 
to commit murder, but he did not commit murder; there is a difference
between trying and succeeding.  Likewise, Sally3’s act might be “self­
defensive” if this is supposed to mean she intended to defend herself.49 
But on my account she does not succeed.  Her act is not actual self-defense. 
Now, when Rickless claims her act is “surely self-defensive,”50 he might
want to say it is surely an act of actual self-defense.  But it is not sure, I think 
it is flatly wrong: Sally3 did not defend herself against Superman, she only
tried to. 
Rickless, however, prides himself on being “less sanguine about the 
possibility of making sense of the distinction between trying and succeeding 
in the case of self-defense.”51  I am a bit surprised by this, for in the past 
some commentators criticized me because they—mistakenly—thought my
account dissolves the distinction between attempted and actual self-defense, 
so I made sure to emphasize that it does not.  And indeed, it should not. 
Yet, Rickless claims that “it is not generally true that there is a difference
between trying to do something and doing it,” offers “[m]ental actions . . .
as the most salient counterexamples to the general claim,” and then raises 
the question of “why we should think that self-defense is any different 
from these mental actions in this respect.”52
 46. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 10. 
47. Rickless, supra note 5, at 352. 




 52. Id. at 354. 
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An obvious answer to this last question is: because it clearly is.  Self-
defense is not a mere mental act.  First, however, I would like to point out 
that Rickless actually fails to provide plausible counter-examples.  He
states:
I see no daylight between inferring Q from P and trying to infer Q from P—to try
to infer Q from P is to succeed in drawing the inference. Similarly, it seems to me
that it is impossible to try to think of my mother without thinking of my mother.53 
First, I would assume that trying to infer Q from P means trying to see
the logical connection between Q and P—to see why P implies Q.  And, 
of course, someone might think he has found the logical connection—“I 
got it!”—when in fact he has not. Second, if Rickless has been adopted
without his knowledge, then he might have failed each and every time to
think of his mother when he tried to think of his mother.  Moreover, even
if you were not adopted, someone might give you a mind-altering drug
and ask you to think of your mother.  But simply thinking mother is not
thinking of my mother, and if I cannot remember her name or conjure up 
any memories of her, then I would fail at thinking of my mother—this is 
certainly possible. 
Thus, even if self-defense were a mental act or like a mental act, this
would not yet dissolve the distinction between attempting to defend oneself
and actually defending oneself.  Yet, Rickless claims:
In these cases, the agents act with the aim of averting or mitigating an attack.  This
seems sufficient for their acts to count as self-defensive, even if, unbeknownst to
them, their beliefs about the effectiveness of those acts are comically mistaken. 
This should be no surprise, given the central importance of intention to the proper
characterization of self-defense: if the nature of self-defensive action consists in
doing something with a certain intention, and—as is the case with all or most
mental actions—trying to intend entails intending, it becomes impossible to make 
room between acting self-defensively and trying to do so.54 
Note that Rickless has not provided any argument to actually show that
the nature of self-defense does consist in doing something with a certain
intention. As far as I can see, he is simply stipulating.  Anyway, if this is 
the nature of self-defense, then Sally2 would defend herself if she just
passively lay there thinking of the Easter Bunny in the belief that it will 
stop her attacker’s knife from slowly sinking into her chest.55  The same 
 479
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54.  Id. at 354. 
55.  See supra p. 476. 











   
    
 
 









    
 
  
        
 
 
     
      
  
should be true of other-defense.56  Thus, if a police officer witnesses a rape, 
does not move a finger, but instead quietly thinks of his mother intending
to thereby magically stop the rape, the police officer would be defending
the victim on Rickless’s account.  While Rickless may deem his account 
a compelling explication of the concept of self-defense, or of other-defense,
I dare predict few others will. 
III. REPLY TO FERZAN
Before addressing Kimberly Kessler Ferzan’s main criticism, let me note
two smaller points.  Ferzan says:
Steinhoff is correct that forfeiture is not reason supplying, but he is incorrect to
argue that “liability is no path to permissibility at all.”  The fact that no right stands in
the way of the action certainly matters to how strong the reasons have to be to justify 
the action.57 
I myself argue at various places in the manuscript that liability contributes 
to the justification of self-defense—for example, in the normative structure
section and in the section on Quong.58  So, maybe the formulation I used 
might be misleading; perhaps what I should have said is not “liability is 
no path to permissibility at all” but instead “liability by itself never provides
a justification.”59  Interestingly, although Ferzan, as we just saw, admits that
“forfeiture is not reason supplying” and refers to a recent publication of hers 
where she has allegedly made “amendments to [her] earlier explication that
Steinhoff criticizes,”60 she still claims in that very same publication that 
“forfeiture is defeasibly sufficient” for permissibility.61  Yet, if forfeiture
is not reasons-supplying, it cannot even be defeasibly sufficient. Forfeiture
is always insufficient. That was the gist of my earlier criticism of what I 
call “rights forfeiture theory,”62 and because she seems not to have changed 
her position in this respect, my criticism stands. 
56. If Rickless thinks there is a difference, I would like to know where that comes 
from. 
57.  Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Defense and Desert: When Reasons Don’t Share, 55
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 265, 269 n.22 (2018) (citation omitted). 
58. See Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 36–47, 171–77. 
59. Although, I think a path that only leads halfway to Rome is not really a path to
Rome but a path halfway to Rome. 
60. Ferzan, supra note 57. 
61. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Forfeiture and Self-Defense, in THE ETHICS OF SELF­
DEFENSE 233, 243 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2016). 
62. Uwe Steinhoff, Shortcomings of and Alternatives to the Rights-Forfeiture Theory
of Justified Self-Defense and Punishment 6 (2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://phil
papers.org/archive/STESOA-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/EXR9-GHJS]. 
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Ferzan also claims: “If one is an objectivist, then there is no defensive 
instrumental good served when defense is futile.”63 I do not see why, nor 
why that should be relevant.  If an objectivist accepts that people simply 
have a prerogative to defend themselves, where defense also comprises
resistance that cannot avert or mitigate an attack or harm—and there is 
nothing intrinsically non-objectivist about such a view—then they can accept 
the justifiability of futile self-defense.  In addition, Ferzan thinks I am 
faced with “the problem of what to do when the defensive means available 
would extend beyond the extent to which the aggressor has forfeited his 
rights. That is, what may a defender do when the only way to stop an aggressor’s 
pinch is to cut off his arm?”64  Well, on my account the defender must not
go beyond that extent.  He can, however, pinch the aggressor—after all, I
allow for futile self-defense, as Ferzan acknowledges.65 
Now to Ferzan’s main criticism.  She is of the opinion that I am wrong 
in thinking that most cases of self-defense are both punitive and defensive 
and in—allegedly—thinking there are only “rare cases in which adding 
self-defense and punishment can justify inflicting more harm.”66  Note,
however, that I actually acknowledge there can be cases where an act that 
also has defensive effects or purposes but cannot be justified by the self-
defense justification nevertheless could be justified as punishment and 
under appeal to a necessity or lesser evil justification.  Ferzan knows that 
I grant this.67  Note also that when I was criticizing McMahan’s way of adding 
up “punitive” and “defensive” harms as “odd,”68 I was really only criticizing 
McMahan—given McMahan’s, increasingly peculiar, account of liability
this supposed adding simply cannot work, and Ferzan originally agreed.69
 63. Ferzan, supra note 57, at 271. 
64. Id.
 65. Id.
 66. Id. at 266. 
67. Id. at 281 n.88.  Note, however, that evidence-relativity has, contrary to what
Ferzan suggests, nothing to do with it.  My account of self-defense is mixed, and so is my
account of punishment. 
68. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 13; see also What is Self-Defense, supra note 3, at 393– 
94. 
69. 	  Namely in a previous draft of Ferzan, supra note 57, at 14.  She now claims: 
Frowe’s friendly amendment to McMahan’s view would dissolve Steinhoff’s 
problem that there is no X to add.  A is liable to X insofar as X is the amount
of proportionate harm that would stop the attack. The problem for B is that she 
lacks the ability to administer X—that is, the punch in the face.
Id. at 276.  That is wrong. Frowe does not provide a friendly amendment, rather, she correctly
points out that McMahan does not have the problem that two other authors attribute to him: to
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So, I do not really think I originally wanted to express the negative view 
about adding that Ferzan ascribes to me, but maybe Ferzan has picked up 
some subconscious vibe in my text because, as it turns out, I am quite
willing—with qualifications to come later—to adopt the view she attributes 
to me.
What the contentious view is can best be seen after some preliminaries
and after considering an example Ferzan provides: 
Two for the Price of One? D threatens to punch E on the subway.
E can stop D by stomping on his foot very hard with her stiletto 
heel. Imagine that as she does so, she thinks both that this will
serve as effective defense and that D deserves it.70 
Ferzan invites us to assume that “a heeled foot stomp is proportionate 
to a punch (X) [and also that] a heeled foot stomp is proportionate to D’s 
desert (X).”71  And she states: 
I believe it is implausible that when E acts, even if she acts intending to defend
and punish, that her act constitutes an act of prevention and punishment simultaneously. 
Here is a first stab at the reason why this is so: if a desert reason is not necessary
to justify an action, that desert reason is not satisfied and will continue to exist.
That is, when an action is overdetermined by the balance of reasons, the desert
reason remains inoperative.72 
I think Ferzan is conflating two issues here that need to be separated: a
descriptive one and a normative one.  On the descriptive level, I find it entirely
implausible to say that although E “acts intending to defend and punish” 
and succeeds both in deflecting the harm from her and in inflicting suffering 
on D, E’s act is nevertheless not “an act of prevention and punishment.”73 
In fact, I find it self-evident that, given Ferzan’s own description of the
case, this most definitely is an act of self-defense and punishment. Thus, 
I do not think this example—or Ferzan’s subsequent discussion—succeeds 
wit, that someone cannot inflict harm X on an aggressor does not mean that the aggressor 
is not liable to that harm. See HELEN FROWE, DEFENSIVE KILLING 99–100 (2014). Yet, 
pace Ferzan, that is not the issue in the present context.  The problem for the defender in
McMahan’s example is not that the defender lacks the ability to administer harm X, but
rather that harm X lacks the ability to be defensive.  Because X is not effective—ex exemplo, it
would not stop the attack—that is the very starting point of the entire discussion there, and 
certainly not open to interpretation—on McMahan’s instrumentalist account the aggressor
simply cannot be liable to it.  So, the problem remains quite undissolved.  As Frowe herself 
says: “Internalists reject liability to defensive harm in cases where . . . even if one used 
proportionate defensive force, that force would not avert the threat.”  Id. at 98. 
70. Ferzan, supra note 57, at 277. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 278. 
73. Id.
482
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in refuting my descriptive claim that most cases of self-defense are also
cases of punishment. 
Yet there is still the normative issue.  Even if one granted that E’s act is
both punitive and defensive, one could still ask: If the harm inflicted here 
is already justified under an appeal to self-defense, does this mean it does
not count in calculating how much punishment the offender still deserves?
And here the contentious issue about adding comes into view: Ferzan says 
yes74; I say, tentatively, no. 
As we already saw, her reason for answering yes is: “If a desert reason 
is not necessary to justify an action, that desert reason is not satisfied and 
will continue to exist.”75  She provides another case to motivate this judgment: 
Assume I take my child and a friend to a movie and decide to buy them both ice 
cream afterwards.  The reason that justifies this is something akin to this is a nice
thing to do for both of them.  Now imagine my child also got an A on a recent 
history test and that I always take him for ice cream to celebrate.  I think he would
have a complaint against me if I said that the post-movie ice cream trip also
counted as his deserved reward for his grade.  That is, although I had two reasons 
on that first occasion to get him an ice cream cone, the fact that one of those 
reasons was sufficient to justify the conduct led to the other reason continuing to
exist.  He continues to have a desert-based reason to get a second dessert.76 
This example does not convince me.  If the child has no legitimate expectation
that, for instance, only the two of them go for an ice cream in celebration 
or if, for example, the celebrations in the past also included a night out 
with friends and ice-cream, I do not see how the complaint could be valid.
Anyway, examples involving children are problematic, because we react
to children very differently than we react to adults.  So, consider this example: 
A stranger returns the wallet I lost to me and deserves, as my
companion and I know, a $10 finder’s fee for it.  I am interested in 
my companion not regarding me as cheap.  I give $10 to the stranger. 
Here, I have both a desert-based reason and a prudential or self-interest­
based reason to give the stranger the money.  Let us suppose I actually act 
on the prudential reason.  Do I then have to give $20 to the stranger because
the desert-based reason continues to exist? That seems counter-intuitive. 
74. See id.  Of course, she would deny, on the descriptive level, that punishment has 
been inflicted at all.  My point is that she need not deny it, and she could put the first 




































     
  
 
      
 
The stranger has no complaint.  He deserved to get $10 and he got what he
deserved. 
In addition, Ferzan notes it is not immediately clear which of the two 
reasons in Two for the Price of One is actually operative.77  Why not the 
punitive one?  Her answer is basically that a private citizen “is ordinarily
not permitted to inflict such [punitive] harm [because she] is constrained 
by her social contract.”78  But, now imagine E is actually Judge Dredd.79 
Dredd lives in a society where the heavily armed judges are also police 
officers and executioners. Would Dredd be justified in foot stomping D 
twice to give him what he deserves?
My tentative answer is—here comes the qualification I announced above:
that depends. While I do not think that everything about proportionality 
is conventional, I think that part of it is.  Societies have some leeway in
deciding what is proportionate and what is not, and that is true for punishment 
as much as for self-defense.  Thus, I think if it is fitting for a society that
harm inflicted on a wrongdoer in self-defense is subtracted from the harm 
he or she deserves as punishment, then that is fine.  If not, that is fine too. 
If our societies had judges of the Dredd kind, I would prefer the former option, 
though.
IV. REPLY TO ALEXANDER
Larry Alexander thinks that with regard to self-defense—or, more precisely,
other-defense—culpability “is the proper focus,” not justification.80  Given 
that, as a moral philosopher writing about self-defense, I am of course interested
in when self-defense is justified or permissible, culpability is most certainly
not the proper focus; at the very least it can hardly be the main focus.  Why
does Alexander think otherwise?  He answers:
 77. Id. at 278. 
78. Id. at 283. 
79. Given the stiletto heels maybe we call him Judge Drag?  In any case, Judge 
Dredd is a fictional character appearing in comic books.  Judge Dredd Wiki, FANDOM, 
http://judgedredd.wikia.com/wiki/Joseph_Dredd [https://perma.cc/WAA6-AJAT]. He is 
a judicial officer known as a “street Judge” in a dystopian future who is empowered to arrest, 
convict, sentence, and execute criminals. Id.
 80. Larry Alexander, The Need to Attend to Probabilities—For Purposes of Self-
Defense and Other Preemptive Actions, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 223, 224 (2018).  Incidentally, 
for justification allegedly not being the proper focus, Alexander, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan,
and Stephen Morse have talked an awful lot about it.  See LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY 
KESSLER FERZAN WITH STEPHEN J. MORSE, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL
LAW 108–33 (2d prtg. 2011). 
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For the simple reason that if TP [a third party defending another person] takes
preemptive action and eliminates the possibility of attack, we will never know
whether the attack and the harm it portends would have occurred.  Justifications
are based on the facts.  But a harmed potential aggressor and unharmed V do not 
by themselves create a state of affairs that is necessarily better than the state of
affairs that would have occurred had TP not acted.81 
If only it were so simple.  First, for reasons that others have already pointed 
out, Alexander is mistaken in thinking justification is about a better state 
of affairs.82 We can be justified in doing something even if it does not
lead to a better state of affairs.  For instance, maybe humanity, including 
Brangelina, would have been much happier if Brad and Angelina had 
stayed together, but that hardly means they were not justified in divorcing. 
Second, while Alexander claims “that most who write on the topic neglect
its perhaps most important aspect, namely, that it is a preemptive action. 
As a preemptive action, self-defense perforce takes place before the attack
to which it is a response occurs,”83 it is in fact mysterious why that should
be an aspect of self-defense at all, let alone its most important.  If someone 
starts shooting at me and I then draw my gun to shoot back, I am not 
eliminating or preempting “the possibility of attack”; rather, the attack is
already ongoing and I am reacting to it.84  Perhaps Alexander would argue 
that you defend yourself to avert or mitigate harm—that is, prevent harm—
but I have argued at length in the manuscript that this is not the case: self-
defense is not necessarily aimed at the aversion or mitigation of harm.85 
Of course, Alexander can deny this, but the credibility of such a denial would 
have to rely on conceptual analysis and argument—a mere stipulation that 
self-defense is preemptive is certainly not enough. 
Third, even if self-defense were preemptive action—so what?  If, as
Alexander says, “[j]ustifications are based on the facts”—by which he
supposedly wants to exclude the beliefs or attitudes of the defender—what 
does it matter that “we will never know whether [the] attack and the harm it 
portends would have occurred”?86  That does not rule out justification as 
 485
81.  Alexander, supra note 80. 
82.  See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Lesser Evils and Justification: A Less Close 
Look, 24 L. & PHIL. 681, 689–708 (2005). 
83.  Alexander, supra note 80, at 223. 
 84.  In fact, Alexander’s talk of a “response” is revealing.  Id. You cannot respond to 
future events or acts, only to past or present ones. 
85.  Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 4–20; see also What is Self-Defense, supra note 3, at 
398. 
86.  Alexander, supra note 80, at 224. 






    
 





















proper focus at all, because as a philosopher—and a legal scholar, legislator,
or judge, I would assume—I am of course interested in what those facts are. 
And indeed, Alexander himself says: 
Don’t get me wrong: The God’s-eye perspective is important. Unless we know 
what ought and ought not be done when we are certain about the relevant facts,
we cannot know what ought and ought not be done when we are less than 
certain—as we always will be.  The God’s-eye perspective is necessary when
theorizing about preemptive defense, but it is surely not sufficient and thus not 
sufficient for assessing the actions of the defender in our case, TP.  TP cannot 
know for certain whether A is culpable or innocent, whether A will actually attack
V if not stopped, and whether V will be harmed. Additionally, TP cannot know 
the extent V will be harmed if A does attack V.  Finally, TP cannot know for certain 
what particular measures will prevent A’s attack and what their consequences
will be.87 
Well, clearly, if justifications are based on facts, then the God’s-eye 
perspective surely is sufficient to assess whether the defender’s action was 
justified.  So, what else remains to be done? How is the uncertainty of the 
defender relevant? An obvious answer would be: it is relevant for the 
question as to whether the defender is excused. Yet Alexander himself
says: “I will not ask whether the defender might be excused for acting 
preemptively.”88  That is, he wants to “avoid bringing excuse into the
analysis.”89  Yet, if an agent is not justified in killing someone, then the
only way of him being non-culpable is to be excused.  But because Alexander 
wants to rule out both justification and excuse, how can non-culpability,
of all things, possibly be “the proper focus”?90  That seems not to make too
much sense.
Moreover, even if we allowed excuses into the analysis, the God’s-eye 
view would still be sufficient.  In fact, how could the God-eyes-view ever 
be insufficient?  Even if we introduced confidence levels or subjective 
probabilities into the formulation of some guidance about self-defense, 
God is still much better at assessing TP’s confidence levels than TP himself. 
It is, after all, simply false to think a TP in a self-defense situation will know
exactly what his own confidence levels with regard to the factors Alexander 
mentions are. Probabilistic self-transparency, or however you might want to
call this, is an illusion. 
Thus, the God’s-eye view is not only sufficient, but definitely the best
perspective to assess whether an agent is justified—or excused, or X, 
whatever X might be.  However, it would be a big mistake to take that as 
an invitation to formulate action-guiding rules with regard to self-defense 
486
87.  Id. at 225. 
88.   at 224. 
89.  Id. (emphasis added).
90.  Id. 
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as if the defender had access to the God’s-eye view. I certainly do not
presuppose the defender has such access, contrary to what Alexander
rather surprisingly claims: “In the overwhelming majority of Steinhoff’s 
examples, the actors are dealing with certainties regarding self-defense 
matters.”91  I doubt there is even one such example in the manuscript let 
alone “the overwhelming majority.”92  Alexander seems to be confusing
the perspective of the philosopher with the perspective of his cast of characters.
Just because a philosopher conjures up a thought experiment involving a 
spider sitting on a copy of Beyond Good and Evil93 does not mean he
attributes to the spider knowledge and certainty that it sits on that book. 
The same is true for philosophers conjuring up examples involving innocent
defenders and culpable attackers.
Now, excuses are not action guiding; justifications are. Because it is, 
as I said, a mistake to formulate action-guiding rules with regard to self-
defense as if the defender had access to the God’s-eye view, theorists who 
derive their normative conclusions from the stipulation that justification 
is “based on the facts”—so that the epistemic limitations of the defender
are irrelevant for justification—“will fail to provide answers usable in the 
real world”—to borrow Alexander’s words.94  In contrast, my arguments
about necessity, proportionality, the subjective element of the self-defense 
justification, and the precautionary principle in self-defense are actually 
all driven by the realization that proper action guidance must take the
defender’s epistemic limitations into account—without selling out to pure 
subjectivism, thereby confusing justification with excuse.  I, therefore, submit 
that it fares significantly better in terms of action guidance then purely 
objectivist accounts of justified self-defense. 
V. REPLY TO ARNESON
Richard Arneson proposes the following principle of “Fault Forfeits 
First,” which he also applies to the case of self-defense: “All else being 
equal, the morally preferred target for violence directed at undoing or 
preventing a serious evil or injustice is an agent who is seriously culpable
 91. Id. at 225 n.5. 
92. Id.
 93. Beyond Good and Evil is a book by the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche.  See 
generally FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL: PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF
THE FUTURE (William Kaufman ed., Helen Zimmern trans., Dover thrift ed. 1997) (1886). 
94. Alexander, supra note 80, at 228. 
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with respect to that evil or injustice and more culpable than anyone else
involved in the situation.”95 He has a very licentious account of what “with
respect to” means.  To wit: 
In principle, fault forfeits first could identify—as the morally preferred person to
die when someone’s behavior or movement threatens another with serious harm—a
guilty bystander who is ill-disposed to the victim and directs hateful thoughts at
her, and who would harm the victim wrongfully if he could.  However, this guilty
bystander has no action available and hence is neither acting nor trying to act
toward the victim at all.96 
He admits that “[t]his feature of fault forfeits first may strike some as
obviously morally outrageous.”97  Well, how outrageous it is depends on what
the principle is supposed to imply. Unfortunately, that is not entirely clear. 
Consider for instance this case:
Hospital: Carl will not get the kidney he needs to survive unless
Bill, who is first in the transplantation queue, dies tonight.  Bill 
hates Carl for racist reasons and would wrongfully kill Carl if he
could—but he cannot.  Carl sneaks over into Bill’s room and suffocates 
him with his cushion.
The name of the principle fault forfeits first suggests, of course, that it 
is a principle about, well, forfeiture.98  Yet, shortly after introducing this 
principle Arneson tries to “illustrate the idea” with some examples, among
them “Accommodation.”99  Here, he says: “In this case I suppose it is morally 
permissible to jump to the niche, killing bystander and saving your life.”100 
Given that Arneson explicitly agrees with my observation that “the fact
that the Culpable Aggressor lacks a claim right not to be harmed does not 
mean harming such an individual is morally justified,”101 the move from
forfeiture to permissibility is unwarranted.  In any case, if fault forfeits 
first is supposed to also be a principle about permissibility—and Arneson 
certainly uses it this way in his entire discussion—then it is, indeed, outrageous. 
While Bill might well have forfeited his right not to be killed by Carl, that 
does not make Carl’s action justified.  In fact, legally and morally it seems 
to be a case of murder or at least manslaughter. 
One reason why Carl’s action might be unjustified is that he might not
know that Bill would kill him if he could.  One might argue it is implicitly
95.  Richard J. Arneson, Self-Defense and Culpability: Fault Forfeits First, 55 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 231, 235 (2018). 
96. Id. at 239 n.30. 
97. Id. at 243. 
98. See id. at 235. 
99. Id. at 236–37. 
100. Id. at 237 (emphasis added). 
101. Id. at 259. 
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presupposed in the example that Carl knows this.  Yet, if it were presupposed, 
then Arneson would not need to argue, as he does in Part IV of his paper, 
that the epistemic limitations of the agent play no role for “evaluative
purposes.”102  In fact, however, they do.  We can very well ask, for evaluative
purposes, whether someone was justified in killing someone else although 
he did not know the objective justifying conditions were given. Another
evaluative question concerns culpability. If someone does not know the 
objective justifying conditions are fulfilled, then he might be as culpable—
or more so—as other people involved.  But then Arneson’s “Guilty Bystander”
example103 not only fails to demonstrate the permissibility of killing the
bystander, it does not even demonstrate that the bystander forfeited his 
right to life in the first place, because it is possible that the threatened agent, 
lacking sufficient knowledge about the situation, is at least as culpable as 
the bystander. 
Moreover, even if Carl somehow knew Bill would kill him if he could,
he cannot know this for certain. Throughout my manuscript I argue that 
epistemic limitations motivate a principle of precaution that also underlies
the necessity and proportionality constraints of justified self-defense: by 
following such a principle, agents reduce the risk of violating the rights of 
others.104  I also argued that proportionality constraints are stricter in the
case of a justifying emergency than in the case of self-defense,105 which is
directed against imminent or ongoing attacks. Bill, however, is not attacking 
anybody.  Carl would kill him not in self-defense, but in self-preservation. 
It seems to me that killing a defenseless patient in a hospital to get a kidney
which that patient otherwise would get cannot be allowed by morality 
even if the killer knows that the patient has forfeited his right to life.  The 
risk that he has not—knowledge does not imply infallibility—is too high 
to justify the killing in a situation like the one described in this example. 
Arneson himself says: “What triggers forfeiture of moral immunity from 
being subject to attack is egregious failure to show due consideration for
others’ legitimate moral rights and interests. Failure to have and show such
concern tends to threaten others with receipt of wrongful harm in many
situations.”106  It seems to me that Carl indeed does not show enough concern 
for the rights of others.
 102. Id. at 245. 
103.  Id. at 238–39. 
104.  Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 17, 147. 
105.  Id. at 80–81. 
106.  Arneson, supra note 95, at 243 (footnote omitted). 
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After admitting the mentioned feature of fault forfeits first may seem 
morally outrageous, Arneson declares: “We should not be stampeded by
this concern into abandoning fault forfeits first.  We should simply recall
the examples already considered, especially Accommodation and Guilty 
Bystander, and consider whether the judgments proposed for these situations 
are acceptable after reflective scrutiny.”107  That, however, is somewhat curious
methodological advice.  Arneson basically tells us to be impressed by one 
set of examples and to dismiss a contradicting set—to which Hospital would 
belong.108  A better approach would certainly be to try to find a principle
or account that does justice to our intuitions in both sets of situations.  My 
intuition in Guilty Bystander,109 however, is that it is not permissible to 
kill the bystander if his throwing snowballs is indeed completely ineffectual.
In Guilty Bystander the driver has no less reason—Arneson wants to keep 
all else equal, after all—to believe in the innocence of the bystander than
in the innocence of the aggressor110 and if you are faced with the choice of 
risking killing either an innocent bystander or an innocent aggressor, then 
you should kill the aggressor because aggressors forfeit their right against 
necessary and proportionate defense.111 
Regarding Accommodation,112 the person in the niche who refuses to 
get out of the way is thereby attempting to commit murder.  He is attacking
the other person and therefore becomes liable to defensive force on my account,
and this force would also be justified if it is necessary and proportionate and
if the subjective element is fulfilled.113  My account does not have the outrageous
implications Arneson’s account has in cases like Hospital, however.  Thus, 
because it has intuitive implications and avoids the counter-intuitive ones,
my account is to be preferred. 
Let me finally note three smaller points: First, concerning necessity and 
a potential victim faced with an aggressor, Arneson says: “If parachuting 
to safety [instead of killing the aggressor] would give her a .999 chance of 
saving herself and a .001% chance of death, she must take the escape option,”114
 107. Id.
 108. See supra p. 489.  I could provide many more examples. 
109. See Arneson, supra note 95, at 238–39. 
110.  In reality he would have more reason to believe in the innocence of the bystander.
111. Of course, not everyone agrees that innocent attackers are liable, but I have 
argued for this position.  Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 162; see also STEINHOFF, supra note 
29, at 80–85; Uwe Steinhoff, Justifying Defense Against Non-Responsible Threats and Justified 
Aggressors: The Liability vs. the Rights-Infringement Account, 44 PHILOSOPHIA 247, 248 
(2016). And it is certainly the majority view.  Moreover, even if one rejects the view that 
they forfeit such rights, it is difficult to also reject the view that their rights at least become
less stringent. 
112. Arneson, supra note 95, at 237. 
113. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 57. 
114. Arneson, supra note 95, at 353. 
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even if, I suppose, shooting the aggressor would give her a 0% chance of 
death. However, I provide an argument against this view: 
[L]et us define a Type R attack as an attack where the defender can be pretty much
certain to survive if he uses lethal defense against the culpable aggressor but has
only a 99% chance to survive such an attack if he uses a taser, and where he only
has these two options of defense.  Thus, the prohibition on using lethal force here
means that one innocent person will have to die for every 100 Type R attacks.
Hence the question arises: if an innocent defender may kill 100 culpable aggressors in
defense of his life, why may he not kill one culpable aggressor in order to have a 
100% survival chance instead of only a 99% one?  Or, to put it still another way:
if one and the same aggressor attacks me every day with a Type R attack, this 
means that the injunction of making allowances for the aggressor will leave him 
occasionally tasered and me dead for good.  It seems that it is actually the innocent 
person’s interests, not the aggressor’s, that are discounted here, and this indeed is
implausible. Thus, from a moral point of view as well the German rendering of 
the necessity condition is correct in the case of culpable aggressors.115 
Because Arneson provides no counter argument, I see no reason to accept
his position. 
Second, Arneson says—using again Helen Frowe’s parachuting example: 
“Culpable Aggressor is attacking [a] victim, who has the options of escaping 
the attack by leaping to safety or instead shooting Aggressor.  She commences
shooting.  For anyone who adheres to a necessity condition for justified
self-defense—as I believe we all should do—Frowe’s victim is acting
impermissibly.”116  Actually, necessity has nothing to do with it.  Shooting 
the aggressor might not be necessary to save her life, but it is necessary to 
defend her life—escape is not defense.117 However, even if you say escape
is defense, and that by escaping you defend your life, you most certainly 
did not defend your right to autonomy or your right not to be bullied into 
leaving a place you had a right to be. Thus, shooting the aggressor is necessary
to defend this right, and if Arneson wants to rule out the permissibility of 
115. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 71. I have come across the objection that an account
of self-defense that rejects the imminence requirement could argue that defending oneself
against the first attack is necessary to defend oneself against the entire sequence of attacks,
and thus necessary to avert a risk close to 100%.  However, that is wrong, because that 
risk can still be averted when the second attack occurs—or the third, or the fourth, and so 
on. Moreover, one should also note that killing the attacker on one of the later occasions 
is less harmful. It is certainly mistaken to claim that living a day more or less is morally 
irrelevant—at least, Western jurisdictions do not deem it irrelevant at all.  Finally, my
example would still work if instead of talking about one and the same attacker, we talked 
about different attackers.
 116. Arneson, supra note 95, at 254 (footnote omitted). 
117. German law is very adamant about this. See Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 4–7, 10. 
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shooting the aggressor, he, therefore, has to do so on grounds of proportionality,
not on grounds of necessity. 
Third, Arneson claims the if and only if phrasing of the following principle 
“rules out futile self-defense as morally impermissible”: 
[I]f and only if someone must die when unjust wrongs are being perpetrated, then 
provided that any choice to kill targets the same number of individuals, it is
morally required that the seriously culpable with respect to this situation, if more 
culpable than others whose deaths would serve the purpose, be chosen as the targets
of violence.118 
This principle does not rule out futile self-defense because futile self-
defense is not all about killing and dying.119 Arneson interprets “the purpose”
as “unjust harm reduction.”120  Yet he provides no argument why that should 
be the purpose of self-defense.  I have argued at length that it need not 
be.121  Of course, Arneson offers as “justification” for his principle the allegedly 
“simple idea that every single person’s life is valuable, sacred if you will.”122 
But, again, even if we accepted the dogma of the sacredness of even Hitler’s 
life—which I see no reason to do123—I am pretty sure that a rapist’s skin 
is not sacred, and therefore scratching it in futile self-defense is, whatever 
else it might be, certainly not a sacrilege. 
VI. REPLY TO WESTEN ON HOHFELD
Peter Westen thinks I misinterpret or misapply Hohfeld in a couple of ways.
Let me note that while I think Hohfeld’s scheme is analytically enormously 
useful, it is not Holy Scripture.  Thus, I will amend Hohfeld if that is useful. 
Of course, this still makes it necessary to get Hohfeld right.  So, let us have a
look at Westen’s comments in this regard. 
Westen lists “seven propositions” that Hohfeld wants to establish and 
claims I, among other scholars, mistakenly “invoke Hohfeld as authority
for assertions that are contrary to propositions 1–7.”124  Given that Westen
entitles his paper Poor Wesley Hohfeld because he thinks so many people 
misunderstand Hohfeld,125 I must reply by saying: “Poor me!”  To wit, I deny
 118. Arneson, supra note 95, at 260 (emphasis omitted). 
119. See Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 4.
 120. Arneson, supra note 95, at 260 (emphasis omitted). 
121. See Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 4–7; see also What is Self-Defense, supra note 3,
at 385–87. 
122. Arneson, supra note 95, at 260. 
123. See Uwe Steinhoff, Against Equal Respect and Concern, Equal Rights, and Egalitarian
Impartiality, in DO ALL PERSONS HAVE EQUAL MORAL WORTH? ON “BASIC EQUALITY” AND
EQUAL RESPECT AND CONCERN 142, 168–70 (Uwe Steinhoff ed., 2015). 
124.  Peter Westen, Poor Wesley Hohfeld, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 449, 450 (2018). 
125. Id. at 450. 
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only one of the seven propositions listed by Westen, namely proposition 
4,126 and to do so I do not invoke Hohfeld’s authority.  Rather, I think Hohfeld 
is wrong on that point.
In any case, more interesting than Westen’s sweeping claim about the 
seven propositions is his more detailed criticism.  For example, Westen 
thinks:
Steinhoff runs afoul of Hohfeld in attempting to explain when an actor, A,
owes compensation to a person, B, who possesses a claim-right vis-à-vis A not to
be harmed.  The answer, Steinhoff argues, depends upon whether B has forfeited
his claim-right not to be harmed, thereby leaving A with a Hohfeldian liberty
to harm B—in which case A does not owe B compensation—or whether B retains 
a claim-right not to be harmed but A is justified in “overriding” it—in which case 
A escapes punishment but owes B compensation for the harm inflicted.127 
Why do I run afoul of this?  Westen explains “that neither forfeiture or 
forfeit figure anywhere in Hohfeld’s Fundamental Legal Conceptions” 
and states:
If Hohfeld were confronted with a case like A Culpable Aggressor—that is, a case
in which A’s jural relation to B changes from A’s having a claim-right against B
to A’s not having it—Hohfeld would invoke the language of powers and liabilities.
He would say that (i) the culpable aggressor’s claim-right against the defender
not to be harmed has always been subject to a liability on the aggressor’s part, a
liability to his claim-right being negated; (ii) the defender’s duty to the culpable
aggressor, in turn, has always been subject to the defender’s power to negate the 
aggressor’s claim-right; and (iii) the liability and power both became operative 
when the culpable aggressor wrongly attacked the defender and the defender chose to
respond.  By virtue of the liability/power becoming operative, the culpable aggressor 
ceased to have a claim-right vis-à-vis the defender not to be harmed and, consequently
—and logically—the defender possessed a liberty-right to harm the aggressor.128 
Fortunately, we do not need to speculate about what language “Hohfeld 
would invoke,”129 for the language he actually does invoke is this: 
[I]f X commits an assault on Y by putting the latter in fear of bodily harm, this
particular group of facts immediately creates in Y the privilege of self-defense,—
that is, the privilege of using sufficient force to repel X’s attack; or, correlatively,
the otherwise existing duty of Y to refrain from the application of force to the
 126. Id.
 127. 
128.  Id. at 452–53 (footnote omitted). 
129.  Id. at 452. 
Id. at 451 (footnote omitted) (quoting Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 36–37). 
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.130  
y virtue of the special operative facts, immediately terminated or 
That Hohfeld says “terminated” or “extinguished”131 signals that he is aware
of the fact that one can refer, with different words, to one and the same
concept. I, for example—instead of saying, as Hohfeld does, that Y’s duty 
not to use force against X has been extinguished or terminated—also say
that, correlatively, X has forfeited his claim right against Y’s using force 
against him. In doing so, I am loyal to Hohfeld’s conceptual framework
without being fetishistic about his use of words, and that seems rather sensible
to me.
Westen also states:
There is no “alchemy” involved [in such] changes in jural relations. Nor, if the 
underlying changes are normatively appropriate, does a commentator need
“knock-down arguments” to “prove” that one set of jural entitlements have been
replaced with their opposites.  On the contrary, if, in a jurisdiction’s judgment, 
events render it normatively appropriate that existing jural entitlements be
replaced with their oppositions, Hohfeld’s conceptions of powers and liabilities
function to conceptualize the normative events that produce the changes in jural
relations.132 
I explicitly say there is no alchemy involved.133  However, I am doing
substantive normative philosophy, not only a conceptual Glasperlenspiel, 
that is, I am concerned with the question as to whether “one set of jural 
entitlements [has] been replaced with their opposites” and thus also with 
the question as to whether events have rendered such changes “normatively 
appropriate.”134 This question is not answered by saying: “If they have, they
have.” 
Westen thinks that not only my use of the word “forfeiture” leads me astray, 
but also my talk about rights-infringements, and in particular my claim 
that people whose rights have been infringed are owed compensation.135 
Westen correctly points out that “conceptions of justifiable infringements
of claim-rights are foreign to Hohfeld” and then explains what “Hohfeld 
would say” about my pharmacist case—a case of justifiable infringement, 
on my account.136  Yet, I respectfully submit that Westen has no idea—nor 
does anybody else, myself included—what Hohfeld would say about such 
130. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED 
IN JUDICIAL REASONING 32–33 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 3d prtg. 1964). 
131. Id. at 33. 
132. Westen, supra note 124, at 453 (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Steinhoff, supra
note 4, at 163 n.472; and then quoting id. at 164, n.473). 
133. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 163, n.472. 
134. Westen, supra note 124, at 453. 
135. Id. at 451–52. 
136. Id. at 453. 
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a case because Hohfeld evidently has not given such a case any thought. 
Others have, and many of them have concluded that such cases give reason 
to amend the Hohfeldian scheme with the concept of justifiable infringement.137 
There is, after all, no reason not to improve on conceptual schemes. 
Westen also reproaches me with the mistake of assuming “Hohfeld
conceptions are normative constraints on the normative relations that 
jurisdictions may wish to establish through law”138 and claims:
Hohfeld would bar compensation, Steinhoff says, because by virtue of the culpable 
aggressor’s losing a Hohfeldian claim-right that the defender not harm him, the 
defender possesses a liberty to harm him, and, by virtue of possessing a liberty-
right to harm the aggressor, the defender cannot be required to compensate him.139 
First, I am not aware of saying this anywhere,140 nor do I make the mistake
Westen is accusing me of.  Again, I am doing substantive moral philosophy,
not mere conceptual analysis.  Thus, I do not deny the conceptual possibility
within Hohfeld’s framework of compensating someone for what you were 
at liberty to do to him; I just deny that this makes moral sense.  Conversely,
Hohfeld’s conceptual scheme also does not imply that you owe compensation 
even to a person whose rights you have violated. Conceptually, one has 
nothing to do with the other.  Yet, in discussing the consequences of rights-
violations, Hohfeld says:
[I]t is clear that if B commits a destructive trespass on A’s land, there arises at
that moment a new right, or claim, in favor of A,—i.e., a so-called secondary
right that B shall pay him a sum of money as damages; and of course B comes
simultaneously under a correlative duty.  Similarly if C commits a battery on A . . . .141 
Hohfeld knows very well that this is not clear on conceptual grounds— 
this is his very point in the passage the quote is from.  Thus, Hohfeld does 
not make an analytical observation here, but a substantive legal claim,
namely that law—or at least sensible law—requires A to compensate B
for A’s violations of B’s rights.  Likewise, I make the substantive moral 
claim that A owes B compensation for even justified infringements of B’s
rights.  Making such claims does not involve confusing analytical distinctions
 137. See, e.g., Andrew Botterell, In Defense of Infringement, 27 L. & PHIL. 269, 269– 
74 (2008).
138. Westen, supra note 124, at 454 (emphasis added). 
139. Id.
140.  I would like Westen to provide the quote where I allegedly say it. 
141. HOHFELD, supra note 130, at 101. 
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with normative constraints—I am not more confused about these things
than Hohfeld.
Westen, however, repeats the charge that I take Hohfeld’s analytical
concepts as constraining “jural relations as jurisdictions may wish to 
establish”; quotes me saying that “whether Hohfeldian rights are violated 
or Hohfeldian duties are discharged is an objective matter (for most rights 
or duties)”; and states that my alleged fears that Hohfeld prejudges the 
question as to whether justification is objective or subjective are misplaced.142 
Yet contrary to Westen, I am nowhere “discussing whether Hohfeld implicitly
has a position on whether justification is subjective rather than objective 
in nature,”143 and I can hardly be of the opinion that Hohfeld’s scheme 
would conceptually make rights and duties an objective—or objectivist— 
matter if I say “for most rights and duties.”  If it were a conceptual matter, 
it would have to be the case for all rights and duties.
On a minor point, Westen quotes144 me saying this: 
Even though it seems too strong to say that the falling man is violating the right
of the other person (perhaps precisely because we associate violations with agency), 
he is nevertheless posing an unjust threat.  People . . . have a duty towards others not
to pose unjust threats to them . . . . [T]he falling man is not discharging his duties 
towards the man standing below . . . .145 
And then he says: “To [Hohfeld], it is conceptually impossible for A to 
fail to fulfill a duty to B unless A also violates B’s claim-right because
claim-rights and duties are ‘correlatives.’”146  Westen is right, of course, 
but as the quote shows, I am not talking about Hohfeld’s language use here
but about ours.147 
Westen is right when he claims that I need to be more precise when talking 
about property and property rights.148  Point taken. 
Part V of Westen’s paper is entitled “Hohfeld’s Proposed Conceptions 
are Comprehensive.”149  Many of the disagreements—also those in some 
of the following sections—between Westen and me seem due to Westen
believing in this comprehensiveness, while I do not.  To wit, against my claim 
that the normative structure of self-defense comprises not only a liberty
and a claim-right, but also a prerogative, Westen asserts: 
142. Westen, supra note 124, at 457. 
143. Id. (emphasis omitted).
144. Id. at 456. 
145. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 164. 
146. Westen, supra note 124, at 456. 
147. However, I will add a footnote in the revised manuscript to avoid here any
misconceptions in this respect right from the start.
148. See Westen, supra note 124, at 459. 
149. Id.
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A’s liberty-right vis-à-vis all persons—including the state—to defend himself 
means that no one can rightly claim he is wrong to defend himself; and A’s claim-
right vis-à-vis all persons—including the state—to defend himself means that no
one may interfere with his liberty-right to defend himself.150 
I, of course, think that a liberty against all persons—including the state— 
does not by itself amount to a permission or justification, and I argue that 
certain peculiarities of permissible self-defense necessitate the invocation
of what I call an act-specific, agent-relative prerogative.  Thus, Westen is 
missing the point when in reply to my question regarding the Norbert– 
Catherine hypothetical—Westen quotes it: “Is it really so clear that Catherine
may kill him?”—he states that under certain conditions “it is clear that
Catherine has a liberty-right to kill Norbert.”151  Maybe, but my may-question 
referred to a permission, not a liberty.
Westen rejects this distinction between liberties vis-à-vis everyone and
permissions.  He states: “[I]n Hohfeld’s taxonomy, [a multital liberty] is 
a ‘permission’ of a person that is binding on everyone else.”152  Well, regarding 
the quote Westen refers to here,153 Hohfeld actually equates—via the quote
of justice Adams—a license with a permission and explicitly distinguishes 
a license from a privilege—liberty-right—and therefore it is rather odd that
Westen adduces this text passage in support of the claim that a multital
liberty is a permission. Be that as it may, the only place where Hohfeld 
himself—that is, outside of quotes—uses the term permit in Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions is this one: 
A rule of law that permits is just as real as a rule of law that forbids; and, similarly,
saying that the law permits a given act to X as between himself and Y predicates
just as genuine a legal relation as saying that the law forbids a certain act to X as
between himself and Y.154 
Note, first, that Hohfeld does not use permit here as referring to a liberty 
towards all persons. He clearly simply uses it as referring to a liberty 
between two persons. Second, note that this is extraordinarily convoluted.
That is not how people talk. Nobody says, for example, “Catherine is permitted
between her and Walter to take his book,” or “Mommy permitted me 
150. Id. at 461. 
151. Id. at 464. 
152. Id. at 466. 
153. See HOHFELD, supra note 130, at 50 (“A license is merely a permission to do an 
act which, without such permission, would amount to a trespass . . . .”) (quoting Clifford 
v. O’Neill, 42 N.Y.S. 607, 609 (1896)). 
154. Id. at 48, n.59. 
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between you and me to take your book.”  That is not proper English.  It 
appears to me, therefore, that Hohfeld is missing something by trying to 
put a permission into the strait jacket of his allegedly comprehensive 
scheme.  Moreover, the alleged comprehensiveness of Hohfeld’s scheme
refers to what he calls “jural relations”155—but in my view a permission 
is no relation at all. 
Thus, even if everyone in the world—including every state, and including 
Norbert, of course—had said to Catherine, “Sure, kill Norbert, we waive 
any right we might have against you not to kill him,” then it seems still 
morally absurd to me that Catherine would now be permitted to kill him 
for the mere fun of it—“I just want to see how his head bursts when I
smash it in with my hammer.”  She just is not permitted to kill him for the 
mere fun of it; and this lacking permission is not a relation toward him 
but a moral demand with regard to him.  Even if everybody had waived
their rights against you killing an innocent person, that does not yet give 
you a permission or justification to kill that person only because you feel
like it. This seems to be a feature of morality that cannot be captured with 
Hohfeld’s scheme—and just ignoring this feature will not do.156 
Finally, Westen at times alleges that I might “conflate[] law with 
moral[ity].”157  I do not think I do, but Westen sometimes fails to realize that
certain philosophers apply—without thereby confusing anything—moral
arguments in a legal context or make moral arguments with legal examples. 
To wit, Westen thinks that I invoke “a flawed argument by Sanford Kadish”
by claiming that if the right to self-defense were a mere liberty-right this 
could not explain why we would deem it wrong of the state to prohibit
self-defense.158  Westen explains: “Kadish and Steinhoff cannot criticize 
a Hohfeldian liberty as a ground for B’s self-defense by reflecting upon
how one would feel if the state prohibited B from defending himself because, 
155. Id. at 65. 
156. I actually think it is also a feature of law.  Note that Westen often talks of
a “liberty toward the [state].”  Westen, supra note 124, at 466.  However, such a construct appears 
nowhere in Hohfeld.  See generally HOHFELD, supra note 130.  I think it is quite possible 
for the state to prohibit some behavior without creating a duty towards anyone to abide 
by this prohibition.  Consider a company, instead of a state.  The company might have as some
of its rules: “If the employer violates the company’s property rights, the employer owes the 
company compensation.”  Another rule could be: “Do not steal from the company.” On one
occasion the company waives its claim-right against others not to take its property because
if it did not, the evil villain would destroy the whole company.  In this scenario, if someone
stole from the company, he would not violate its rights, but he would still violate the prohibition
against stealing from the company.
157. Westen, supra note 124, at 465. 
158. Id. at 462. 
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if the state prohibited B from defending himself, B would lack rather than
possess such a liberty.”159 
Westen misunderstands Kadish’s argument.  Here is Kadish: “Suppose,
for example, the law did prohibit defensive killings.  One’s sense of the 
matter is that such a law would be unjust.  But the forfeiture theory, as far 
as it goes, would not impugn such a law or explain why it would be wrong.”160 
Yes, in Hohfeld’s scheme, the state’s prohibiting self-defense would mean
that people lack the legal liberty to defend themselves.  They still would 
have, says Kadish—and I—the moral liberty to defend themselves, however. 
Yet, this moral liberty by itself cannot explain why the state would morally 
wrong people by prohibiting self-defense, that is, why such a law would 
be unjust; in contrast, the moral claim-right against others, including the 
state, that others not interfere with the exercise of one’s moral liberty to 
defend oneself does explain that. 
In sum, I think, pace Westen, that I make good use of Poor Wesley’s 
conceptual scheme; and I can do so partly because I allow myself to still look
beyond it.
VII. REPLY TO WESTEN ON “UNWITTING JUSTIFICATION” 
The issue between Westen and me here is how to treat unwittingly 
“justified” attackers.  It is important, however, to note where exactly the 
issue lies. Westen claims “that the dispute between objectivists and
subjectivists is not about whether such actors [namely unwittingly “justified” 
attackers] should be punished but about what, as between attempt and 
completed crimes of harm, they are most appropriately punished for.”161 
Yet Westen is well aware that at least this subjectivist—that is, I 
myself162—has no particular problem with both Jill and Jill-2163 being 
charged merely with attempted murder.  Therefore, it is strange that he
repeats this false claim. Maybe he thinks that at least pure subjectivists— 
unlike those who have a mixed account —simply must have a problem with 
both Jill and Jill-2 being charged merely with attempted murder.  But that is 
159. Id.
160. Sanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law, 
64 CAL. L. REV. 871, 884 (1976). 
161.  Peter Westen, Unwitting Justification, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 419, 425 (2018). 
162. Although I do not see myself as subjectivist anyway because I defend a mixed
account. 
163. Westen, supra note 161, at 424–25, 443. Jill-2, unlike Jill, resides in a jurisdiction 
that “defines justification objectively.” Id. at 424. 
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simply not true; one can be a subjectivist about justification without being
a subjectivist about murder.  In any case, and to avoid misunderstandings, 
let me repeat what I say in the manuscript on this point: 
One interpretation [of the anti-objectivist criticism] would be that if one has
actually killed Earl, then one cannot say that one only attempted to commit 
murder—after all, the killing of Earl was successful. However, this depends on how
one understands murder.  On my account . . . Earl has forfeited his right not to
be killed. And if one defines murder in such a way that by definition it involves the
killing of someone who has the right not to be killed, then killing Earl would not
be murder.  It would, indeed, only be attempted murder (because Jill attempted
to kill someone of whom she had to assume that he indeed had a right not to be 
killed, but her assumption was wrong.).164 
So, my misgivings about objectivism lie elsewhere, and on the same page
I explicitly say where: 
While it is indeed completely consistent, given a suitable definition of murder, to
say that Jill’s successful killing of Earl was only attempted murder, it is not 
consistent to say that Jill’s killing of Earl was both justified and unjustified. Thus
if Jill’s killing of Earl was attempted murder, and we deem attempted murder to 
be unjustified and impose criminal (and moral) liability for it on the act’s perpetrator, 
then we cannot simultaneously say that the killing of Earl was justified self-
defense. One and the same act cannot be simultaneously unjustified attempted 
murder and justified self-defense.165 
Because the attempted murder and the actual killing are the same act, 
they cannot have different properties.  In fact, because they both produce
the same net benefit they cannot impose criminal liability on the agent, if, 
as Paul Robinson claims, the production of net harm is a prerequisite of 
criminal liability.166 
To the passage just quoted—which he also quotes—Westen answers this: 
It is a category mistake to think that criminal attempts, once they are complete,
are acts to which justification and lack of justification apply.  Justification and
the lack of it apply to offenses that are framed in terms of prima facie harms. 
Justification, and the lack of it, come into play after an actor inflicts or risks such
a prima facie harm, and does so to determine whether the harm he inflicted—or
believed he was inflicting—was a harm the state does, indeed, wish to prevent, 
all things considered.  In contrast, criminal attempt is not a crime of prima facie
harm.  It is a crime of intent of which the so-called act of attempt is merely
constitutive evidence.
. . . If what a person intends to do is justified, a person is not guilty of attempt; 
if what a person intends to do is not justified, the person is guilty of attempt, 
provided the person engages in a requisite act and has the requisite mens rea 
164. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 140 (footnote omitted).
165.  Id. 
 166. See id.
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regarding lack of justification.  Thus, contrary to Steinhoff, there is no such thing
as a justified attempt.167 
Note that, in the penultimate sentence of this quote, Westen suggests an
approach that I explicitly discuss in Section 2.2. of “The Subjective Element” 
chapter, namely the “culpable right action” account.168  However, I simply 
do not think this account is a reasonable interpretation of attempt liability.
Rather, it is something completely different. 
So, let us have a look at Westen’s comments on attempt liability.  To begin
with, to say attempt is “a crime of intent”169 is mistaken.  I have omitted the
footnotes of the quote, but it is worth mentioning that after “constitutive 
evidence” Westen originally added a footnote where he refers to the Model 
Penal Code as saying that “[a]n act of attempt can be ‘anything’ that a person 
does or omits to do . . . that strongly corroborates his criminal intent.”170 
Westen, rather surprisingly, seems to think the MPC’s position supports 
his view, but of course it contradicts it.  The MPC says that an attempt is
what a person does or omits to do, it does not say that it is an intention.171 
And indeed Westen himself admits that to be guilty of attempt there must
be “a requisite act.”172  Without such an act there can be no crime.  Of course, 
there must also be a mental element, but this mens rea requirement is 
something that attempts share with other criminal acts, which is not particularly 
surprising given that attempts are acts.
Moreover, I am criticizing Robinson and claim his account is incoherent, 
and because Westen says he has “always found Paul Robinson’s position 
so compelling,”173 I would assume he is trying to defend Robinson against
my criticism here.  But then he should consider what Robinson is saying, 
and not in defense against my incoherence charge introduce an account of
attempt liability that is actually alien to Robinson.  To wit, Robinson says:
It has been suggested, for example, that inchoate offenses such as conspiracy,
solicitation, and attempt are by definition crimes from which no ultimate harm
results—in other words, punishment is imposed for intending to do harm or for
creating a risk of harm.  I will contend, however, that the inchoate offenses do not
punish bad intent evidenced by overt acts, but rather punish conduct which is
 167. Westen, supra note 161, at 438. 
168. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 145–50. 
169. Westen, supra note 161, at 438. 
170. Peter Westen, Unwitting Justification (2018) (unpublished draft) (on file with author).
171. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARY § 5.01(1) (AM. LAW INST., Official
Draft and Revised Comments 1985). 
172. Westen, supra note 161, at 438. 
173. Id. at 421. 
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harmful to society in a way apart from the harm which might have resulted had
the actor’s intent been fulfilled.  The harm is intangible in character, and society is 
its object.  Inchoate offenses not only create a risk of harm, they are harms in 
themselves.174 
Evidently, Robinson does not share Westen’s interpretation of attempt 
liability at all.  Consequently, my critique of Robinson’s objectivism stands 
unrefuted.
Moreover, Westen’s interpretation is strange even in the light of his own 
Platonic account of the distinction between attempt liability and the completed 
crime.  He states:
Society should reduce penalties for failed impossibility attempts, [Plato] says, not
out of sympathy or pity for failed attempters or because society believes them to
be less deserving of blame and suffering. Instead, he notes, society should reduce 
penalties for failed attempts on its own account: society should reduce such 
penalties because society itself experiences—and ought to experience—different
emotional reactions to failed attempts than to successful attempts, and because
society’s public punishments ought to express those different reactive emotions.175 
That sounds quite plausible.  What is not plausible, however, is to then
go on and throw attempts and intentions into the same basket.  Looking at 
Francis from 100 meters distance and intending to cut off his head is one 
thing; attempting to cut it off by swinging one’s machete and just barely 
missing his neck is another thing; and actually cutting off his head is still
another thing.  It seems to me that society has good reason to be even more
“relieved”176—to use Westen’s expression—when the threshold from intention 
to attempt is never crossed in the first place than when it is. Should we 
not also express our different reactive emotions to attempts on the one hand
and mere intentions on the other?  If so, then one should not construe attempt 
liability as intent liability.
Let us also have a look at Westen’s subsequent claim that: 
If what a person intends to do is justified, a person is not guilty of attempt; if what
a person intends to do is not justified, the person is guilty of attempt, provided
the person engages in a requisite act and has the requisite mens rea regarding lack
of justification. Thus, contrary to Steinhoff, there is no such thing as a justified
174. Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite
of Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 269 (1975) (footnotes omitted).  Westen claims: 
Steinhoff relies on Robinson’s statement to argue that, if attempts do indeed inflict 
harm, they should be treated like crimes of prima facie harm and, therefore, once 
committed, be assessed in light of any alternative harms that would have occurred in
their absence, in order to determine if the attempts are justified.
Westen, supra note 161, at 438.  Actually, I do nothing of that sort; I simply rely on the
Robinson quote to show that he, unlike Westen, does not take attempt liability to be mere 
intent liability.  I think the quote speaks for itself.
175. Id. at 427 (footnotes omitted). 
176. Id. at 428. 
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attempt. A person who possesses the requisite intent and acts on it is guilty and
ought to be punished, and to ask thereafter whether the attempt is justified or 
unjustified is meaningless.177 
I beg to differ.  Imagine the sadistic villain Scarlet credibly and truthfully
threatens poor Kevin as follows: “If you do not attempt seriously to steal
the Matisse from the museum, I will explode an atomic bomb in New York.  
And if you actually succeed in stealing the Matisse, I will do so too.  So,
your only hope is that the attempt gets thwarted.  But you know I can see 
if you do not try hard.”  Kevin’s best bet to steal the Matisse is by sneaking 
into the museum’s post office and changing the address on the envelope
in which the Matisse has been put to send it to the art restorer.  Kevin does
that. The only way to leave the museum is via a Star Trek transporter, 
which will transport him into an isolation chamber where he has to remain 
for a week without any possibility of escape or communication. The envelope, 
however, would only need a day to arrive at Kevin’s house.  Kevin intends 
to keep the Matisse if he gets it and New York is destroyed—which he hopes 
will not happen. Thus, he really does intend to steal it although he hopes not 
to succeed. Moreover, once Kevin has been transported to the isolation 
chamber his attempt is completed.  It is out of his hands now.
If now Kevin attempts to steal the Matisse, he is, on Westen’s account,
guilty of attempt, for what he intends to do is not justified—it would lead
to the destruction of New York.  But that is intuitively clearly the wrong 
result. Merely attempting to steal the Matisse is justified—it will reduce 
net harm—while actually stealing the Matisse is, on the objectivist account, 
not justified—it will lead to net harm.  Now, consider a variation of the
case: Unbeknownst to Bob—who intends to steal the Matisse—Scarlet will 
destroy Hong Kong if he does not attempt to steal the Matisse from the 
museum and also if he succeeds in stealing it.  Bob and Kevin intend to 
do the same thing, so it would seem that Westen would have to hold both 
Bob and Kevin liable. My account—in which knowledge is an element 
of the justification—in contrast, can distinguish the two cases in the right
way and need not help itself to deeper motivations or meta-intentions or
other entirely unnecessary complications: Kevin is not liable and Bob is
liable because Kevin’s attempt to steal is justified while Bob’s is not. 
I think this is pretty much a knock-down counter-example to Westen’s 
argument.  In fact, how knock-down it is can be seen by Westen’s comments 
on it.  To wit, he repeatedly claims I reason “that Kevin satisfied the elements 
177. Id. at 438. 
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of attempting to commit a theft” and that I base my argument on this 
assumption.178  That is correct, but hardly amounts to a counter-argument.
Given that Kevin clearly does attempt to commit theft, I can rather safely
base my argument on this fact.  Westen also says, “[g]iven Kevin’s grim
alternatives, it can hardly be said” that “meticulously taking the multiple 
necessary steps on his part to complete the theft . . . . was the wrong course 
of action.”179  Yet Westen rather astonishingly thinks that by making this
statement he is somehow contradicting or even refuting me.  Unfortunately 
for him, he is not, because I say exactly the same thing.  “Meticulously taking
the multiple steps that were necessary on his part to complete the theft,” 
after all, is Kevin’s attempt to steal the Matisse.  So, if that is justified,
then an attempt can be justified. However, there is a difference between
meticulously taking the multiple steps that were necessary on Kevin’s part 
to complete the theft and doing things that are sufficient to complete the 
theft—there is a difference between trying and succeeding.  And my point 
is precisely that an objectivist would have to say that merely trying to steal
the Matisse is justified while actually stealing it is not, because the former
will save New York and the latter leads to its destruction.180  So far, as we 
have seen, Westen has said nothing that would undermine my point; in 
fact, what he is saying unwittingly supports it. 
In the paragraph from “Again, Steinhoff” to “can justify it” Westen simply
repeats his claim that attempts cannot be justified.181  However, my hypothetical
shows otherwise, and simply insisting on the disputed claim will not do. 
In fact, Westen does not completely address my example anyway: the force
of the example lies not only in the distinction between Kevin’s justified attempt
to steal and Kevin’s unjustified actual stealing but between Kevin’s justified 
attempt to steal and Bob’s unjustified attempt to steal.  I can straightforwardly 
explain this difference in liability between Kevin and Bob by appeal to
the knowledge requirement—as easily as I can explain the liability of
Westen’s shopkeeper.182  Because I can explain this, Westen’s shopkeeper
example is no challenge to me.  Conversely, however, Westen has still given 
us no explanation as to where the difference between Bob’s and Kevin’s
 178. Id. at 441; see also id. at 441 n.67. 
179. Id. at 440. 
180. Incidentally, Westen seems to have difficulties in distinguishing between the attempt
to steal and actually stealing. To wit, he says that “Kevin chose to steal—in lieu of pretending 
to steal—because he thought stealing maximized his chances that the theft would be
thwarted.” Id. at 447, n.67.  However, stealing is to commit theft while an attempt to steal being 
thwarted means one did not—on this occasion—commit theft.  Thus, while attempting to 
steal is a necessary precondition for the possibility that the theft will be thwarted, actually
stealing means the theft will definitely not be thwarted.
181. Id. at 441. 
182. See id. at 441–42. 
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liability—and there clearly is a difference—is supposed to come from if, 
as Westen claims, attempt liability is present wherever someone intends— 
as do both Kevin and Bob—to do something unjustified.183 In fact, Westen
does not even try to explain this difference in liability between Kevin and 
Bob, mentioning poor Bob not even once.184  Therefore, my challenge to 
Westen remains unrefuted. 
Let me jump for a moment to the end of Westen’s paper.  I complain about
objectivist accounts not providing proper action guidance.  To repeat part 
of the quote that Westen also adduces: 
[I]f a proponent of this view is asked by someone: “I would like to go into a full 
theater and shoot randomly at the guests, is that permissible?”, then on pain of
inconsistency the proponent would have to answer: “Well, that depends on who 
you will hit.  If you hit people like Earl (or Hitler) it’s fine, otherwise not.” . . .
These answers, however, would certainly not be given by ordinary speakers, that
is, by speakers who understand what terms like “permissible” and “justified” 
mean.185 
It would therefore explain a lot if Westen did not understand what 
permissible and justified mean. That he indeed might not understand is 
suggested by his reply, to wit: 
A Platonic objectivist envisages the very same action guidance as Steinhoff because,
like Steinhoff, he assesses a person’s criminal desert by the wrong that the person
believes or ought to know he is in fact committing, not by harms that result from
his fully acting on his beliefs.  A Platonic objectivist would give the . . . shooter
the very same warning that Steinhoff would give him. They would both warn him, 
“Do not try to kill people whom you believe or ought to know you are unjustified
in killing.”186 
This is flatly wrong.  Westen confuses action guidance with the assessment 
of a person’s criminal desert. However, these are not the same.  Justification 
and permissibility speak to the former, culpability to the latter.  Given that 
on Westen’s account the random shooter is justified as long as, out of pure 
blind luck, he hits only the right people, objectivism definitely does not
tell them, “Do not try to kill people whom you believe or ought to know 
you are unjustified in killing.”187  Rather, it tells them: “You may go ahead 
in trying to kill people you believe to be unjustified in killing, as long as 
183.  Like committing a theft that will lead to the destruction of a city.
184. See generally Westen, supra note 161. 
185. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 154–55. 
186. Westen, supra note 161, at 446. 
187. Id. (emphasis added). 
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you are lucky enough to end up killing the right people.”  And that is not 
proper action guidance—as even Westen must feel, otherwise he would 
not—however incorrectly—claim that his objectivism gives the same action 
guidance as my mixed account.  To be sure, due to Westen’s—mistaken, 
as we saw—account of attempt liability, his objectivism would also tell the 
shooter that he would still be guilty of attempt liability if he justifiably shot 
into the crowd without fulfilling the knowledge requirement.  But telling 
the shooter that is not telling him what to do. It merely tells him what he 
will be—namely, guilty.  Thus, a potential shooter getting Westen’s verdict
regarding attempt liability can still rightly complain: “I didn’t ask you whether 
I would be guilty or not.  I asked you what I may or may not do.  In fact, I am
quite willing to sacrifice my innocence for doing the right thing.  So, may
I shoot them or not?”  And again, objectivism’s answer to this question is not 
helpful. It is not proper action guidance. 
Finally, I would also like to point out that Westen does not address my
criticism of Robinson’s pseudo-objectivist account of the justified arrest
of innocent people.188 If objectivism does not lead to the right results there,
there is no reason to accept it at all. Thus, I think my criticism of objectivism 
withstands Westen’s arguments. 
Let me now return to the already mentioned “culpable right action”
account.189  In that context I advance the argument that objectivism makes
justified self-defense practically impossible.  I say: 
[I]t is a simple fact of physics that . . . if Jill had fired a shot at a certain time t 
while holding her weapon in a certain position p the bullet of her gun would have 
struck the bullet coming out of Earl’s gun in midair and deviated it in such a way 
as to save the life of Earl’s innocent rival. . . . [T]hus it was objectively unnecessary
and unjustified for her to kill Earl.190 
Of course, she does not know how to do that, but that should not be relevant 
for an objectivist. For objectivist justification, it simply does not matter 
what the agent knows. So much the worse for objectivism.
Westen is not convinced by my argument.  He states: 
Steinhoff’s argument suffers from two problems that, I believe, are fatal to his 
position: (1) his critique, if valid, applies as much to his own theory of justification as
to objective justification, thereby producing the reductio ad absurdum that, regardless 
of which theory one adopts, justified self-defense hardly ever obtains; and (2) his
critique is premised on an erroneous notion of necessity for purposes of objective 
justification.191
 188. See Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 151–54. 
189. See supra p. 501. 
190. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 148. 
191. Westen, supra note 161, at 443. 
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Yet, Westen realizes I have “a response” to the first charge.192  Indeed
I do. Contrary to what he suggests in the quote, I have argued at length— 
precisely against objectivist accounts, among others—for a very lenient 
interpretation of the necessity requirement.  Thus, my argument in the How 
the Purely Objectivist Account Makes Justified Self-Defense Practically 
Impossible section of my manuscript is that an objectivist account cannot
adopt such a lenient interpretation of the necessity requirement, while my
mixed account can and does.193  To wit, Phillip Montague, an objectivist,
seems to adopt what I call the formulaic interpretation of necessity,194 
namely the “use literally the least harmful means” interpretation.195  With 
regard to the cowboy example in the necessity section,196 he is indeed of
the opinion that the cowboy shooting instead of saying “Boo” would be 
unjustified although the cowboy could not possibly know that saying “Boo” 
will save him.197  In the section under discussion now I only take this up a 
notch, showing that the formulaic interpretation leads to counter-intuitive
results not only in weird hypotheticals, but in all cases, including the most
mundane cases of self-defense.  Thus, while I think Montague’s account
of necessity is wrong, I think he is consistent as an objectivist—he also
rejects a probabilistic approach198—the formulaic account seems to be the
only account an objectivist can accept.  Likewise, I do not see how a 
consequentialist like Hurd could accept another account—I took her to be 
talking about the actual best consequences, not about probabilities.199 
Yet, Westen does invoke probabilities. He states, and I quote him at length: 
The appropriate metric for objective justification is not an ex post measure of the
mildest act that it is theoretically possible for Jill to have performed, however
infinitesimally small such possibilities might be.  It is an ex ante measure of
probabilities as they existed at the time Jill acted. It is an ex ante measure of the
mildest act that it is likely that Jill, given her individual physical and psychological 
capacities, could have succeeded in bringing about to prevent the harm.  Anything 
less would oblige self-defenders, under penalty of punishment, to either sacrifice 
192. Id. at 444. 
193. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 145–50. 
194. See generally Philip Montague, Blameworthiness, Vice, and the Objectivity of
Morals, 85 PAC. PHIL. Q. 68 (2004) (focusing especially on Parts I and II). 
195. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 58. 
196. Id. at 73. 
197. Personal Conversation with Phillip Montague, Professor Emeritus, Department 
of Philosophy, Western Washington University (July and August 2014). 
198. See generally Montague, supra note 194. 
199. See HEIDI M. HURD, MORAL COMBAT 263–67 (1999). 
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ongful aggression or perform actions they have no likelihood of 
This does not mean that the metric is “epistemic” in being subjective to the
actor at issue.  The metric is an objective standard in being based upon society’s
considered judgment regarding the ex ante probabilities that existed at the time
the actor acted, regardless of whether the actor himself was, or was not, aware of 
the probabilities at the time.  Nor does the metric reduce to a “reasonability requirement”
in being based upon facts known to the actor at the time he acted.  It is based upon 
such facts regarding ex ante probabilities as society is aware of at the time of
judgment, regardless of whether they were or were not known by the actor at the 
time he acted.200 
First, I do not understand why an objectivist like Westen suddenly talks about 
likelihoods. This simply comes out of the blue.  Moreover, just as we
would be rather surprised if an alleged objectivist about physics claimed
that it is a matter of community standards as opposed to mind-independent
reality whether some cause X is necessary for some effect Y, we should also
be rather surprised—and I am—when an objectivist about justification tells
us that it is a matter of community standards as opposed to mind-independent 
reality whether some means X is the mildest means to avoid Y. 
Second, what does it mean to talk of “the mildest act that it is likely that
Jill, given her individual physical and psychological capacities, could have 
succeeded in bringing about to prevent the harm”?201 As I made clear in 
the manuscript—including the relevant passage Westen quotes—the likelihood, 
also ex ante, that Jill could succeed in stopping the bullets in midair by
holding her gun in a certain way and firing at a certain time is one.202 It 
is not merely a probability, it is a determinacy.  If she acts in a certain way,
she will succeed.  That is a fact of physics.  However, one might ask, what 
is the likelihood that she can act in that way and thus satisfy the if-clause?
Well, if the can refers to her physical and psychological capacity, the 
likelihood, again, is one: it is not probable that she is able to hold her gun 
in a certain way and fire it at a certain time, it is a definite fact that she can
do so—she is not disabled, neither physically nor mentally.
So what, then, are the “ex ante probabilities”203 in question that Westen, 
as objectivist, has in mind?  That Jill will succeed in defending herself in
this way, or that the community thinks she will succeed in defending herself 
in this way?  But why should that matter?  Consider a skilled heavyweight 
boxer who could easily defend himself against an attack by a little person 
by knocking that person out.  Yet, he has an irrational fear of little persons. 
In fact, due to mistakes on their side, he has in the past been attacked ten 
200. Westen, supra note 161, at 444–45 (footnotes omitted). 
201.  Id. at 444. 
202. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 148. 
203.  Westen, supra note 161, at 445. 
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times by little persons—he had the fear before.  On each occasion, he was
overcome by fear, and instead of knocking them out, he shot them dead.
Thus the ex-ante probability—epistemic, propensity, frequentist, and 
community-based—that he will defend himself against a little person by 
any other means than by killing him or her is—close to—zero.  Does that 
make his lethal self-defense necessary in the relevant, namely justificatory, 
sense? I do not think so.  Would the community think so?  I doubt it. 
Thus, Westen faces a dilemma. He can focus on what the person is
likely to do. That, however, is irrelevant for justification, as the boxer case
shows—or the case of a psychotic serial killer who kills everybody who 
looks at him the wrong way.  Or he can focus on what the person can do. 
But, as already established, the person can, indeed, use the objectively mildest 
means. Again, that is just a physical and anatomical fact, and I thought
objectivists were very much concerned about facts.  Westen does not overcome
this dilemma—nor does any other objectivist. 
Thus, the objectivist still owes us an account of necessity that (1) can
overcome this problem, (2) is not entirely ad hoc, and (3) fits objectivism.
My non-objectivist account of necessity, relying on a reasonability metric,
in contrast, does not even encounter the problem. I therefore think it 
is preferable. 
Finally, let me note the interesting fact that an objectivist net harm 
theory cannot even explain why there should be a necessity criterion in
the first place.204  To wit, if a defender knows he can stop a culpable agent 
who would otherwise kill ten innocent people by either knocking him down
or by shooting him, shooting him would still have avoided net harm—the 
lives of ten innocent people outweigh the life of one culpable aggressor— 
so unnecessarily shooting him would still have to be justified.  So where 
does the necessity criterion of justified self-defense come from?
To be sure, Westen sometimes talks about objective justification being 
what society “regrets.”205  However, if this is supposed to be compatible with 
Robinson’s net harm theory, so society only regrets net harms, then the regret
theory obviously faces the same problem as the net harm theory.  If, however, 
society can regret all kinds of things, then it can also regret unknowingly
justified killings and thus attempted murders—and last time I checked society 
indeed seemed to regret that—and in that case the regret theory, pace Westen, 
204.  To be fair, virtually no self-defense theorist explains that. 
205. Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A Justification,
Not an Excuse—and Why It Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 865–66, 875–78 (2003). 
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would speak in favor of the knowledge requirement and the view that attempts 
can be unjustified—or justified. 
In contrast to Westen and Robinson’s account, and to any other objectivist 
account, for that matter, the account I favor can explain both the existence 
of the necessity requirement and its lenient—and thus non-objectivist— 
contours in a straightforward, theoretically consistent, and plausible manner.
Indeed, the knowledge requirement itself is the key.  The argument, basically,
is as follows. Morality must provide proper action guidance.  A morality
concerned with the rights of innocent people cannot, on pain of inconsistency,
leave it to pure blind luck whether agents violate the rights of innocent people 
or not.  Thus, proper action guidance must enjoin people to take reasonable
precautions not to violate the rights of innocent people—see the example
of the random shooter.206  However, taking reasonable precautions involves 
a mental state, it requires people to act reasonably.  Accordingly, they must 
have a reasonable, that is justified, belief that the other conditions of justified 
self-defense are fulfilled.207 
Such a justified belief is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition for
justified self-defense, because a rights-violation committed on the basis 
of a reasonable belief is still a rights violation.  Therefore, my account is 
mixed: it requires justified true belief. That is the knowledge requirement. 
However, ought implies can.  The ought implies can principle does not help 
the objectivist account, because Jill can do the things which would amount 
to the objectively mildest defensive means.  But the principle does enable
the mixed account to derive a less demanding necessity principle, for while
she can do what amounts to using the objectively speaking mildest means, 
she cannot know what that means is. Even if she accidentally does it
or even if she takes a wild guess and rightly believes that a certain measure
is the objectively mildest one, that still does not amount to a justified belief, 
and thus it does not amount to knowledge.  Thus, if ought implies can, and
if there is a knowledge requirement of justified self-defense, the necessity
requirement must be formulated in such a way that the defender can know
what necessity requires.  Hence, an account that demands a knowledge 
requirement can straightforwardly explain why the necessity requirement
must not appeal to physical facts that are epistemically inaccessible to the 
defender. The objectivist account cannot explain that.
 206. See supra p. 505. 
207. These conditions strike a balance between the interests, and in particular the 
protection of the rights, of innocent defenders, innocent aggressors, and culpable aggressors. 
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VIII. REPLY TO WALEN
Alec Walen thinks my view that rights may sometimes permissibly be
infringed is mistaken; he believes the bystanders in the tactical bomber
case are not permitted to defend themselves against the justified bombers—
who would collaterally kill the bystanders—and that his “Mechanics of 
Claims” is a “better way to conceive of situations like this.”208  Let us see:
What is Walen’s Mechanics of Claims? He states:
On this model, first-order Hohfeldian rights are conclusions reached by balancing
moral considerations that centrally involve competing claims of patients on an
agent and the agent’s own claims.
. . . .
We call the balancing of patient- and agent-claims the Mechanics of Claims
because of its parallels to Newton’s mechanics.  In Newtonian mechanics, various
forces can act on an object at a given time.  The balance of external forces, the mass
of the object itself, and any forces originating in the object together determine 
if and how the object will move. In our Mechanics of Claims, competing patient-
claims pull an agent in different directions—towards or away from a given course
of action or its alternatives.  Her agent-claims are internal forces that can work to
resist and sometimes overpower the combined force of the external claims on her.
The balance of these competing forces determines how she is permitted or required to
act.209 
Most moral philosophers do not think trees have moral Hohfeldian claim-
rights. But even if a 500-year-old oak tree has no claim-right against me 
that I do not cut it down, and even if all persons in the world have waived
their presumed moral claim-rights against me that I do not cut it down, 
cutting it down for the mere fun of it nevertheless seems to be wrong.  If that 
is correct, then what is permissible to do is not determined by Hohfeldian 
rights alone.
Interestingly, Walen actually admits that not “all wrongness is picked 
up by the Hohfeldian framework,” but he thinks considerations like respect 
for nature or oneself “supplement the restrictions on agent[s]; they do not
 208. Alec Walen, The Right to Cause Harm as an Alternative to Being Sacrificed for 
Others: An Exploration of Agent-Rights with a Special Focus on Intervening Agency, 55
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 381, 408 (2018). 
209. Alec Walen & David Wasserman, Agents, Impartiality, and the Priority of Claims 
over Duties: Diagnosing Why Thomson Still Gets the Trolley Problem Wrong by Appeal 
to the “Mechanics of Claims,” 9 J. MORAL PHIL. 545, 551–52 (2012). 
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empower agents, which is what infringing would imply.”210  Yet, Walen provides
no argument for this curious asymmetry.  If non-Hohfeldian considerations 
can make it unjustifiable to act on one’s Hohfeldian liberty, why, conversely, 
should they not also be able to make it justifiable to act against one’s 
Hohfeldian duty?  Intuitively, it seems to be a rights-infringement if I save 
the 500-year-old oak tree by using someone else’s water-filled one-cent 
balloon to put out the incipient fire, but it nevertheless also seems justified. 
Thus, the possibility that rights can be permissibly infringed cannot simply
be rejected by insisting on a certain model.  What is important is the model’s
adequacy. 
Given, moreover, that in Walen’s model “Hohfeldian rights are conclusions 
reached by balancing moral considerations that centrally involve competing 
claims of patients on an agent and the agent’s own claims,”211 it is worth 
noting that within a Hohfeldian framework it is perfectly possible A has a 
duty towards B to do X and a duty towards C and D not to do X.  But then, 
of course, neither recourse to Walen’s claims nor to the resulting Hohfeldian
rights and duties can actually dissolve this collision of rights and duties. 
However, recourse to permissible rights-infringement can. 
Finally, Walen’s Mechanics of Claims cannot even explain where the
difference between liberty-rights, claim-rights, and powers comes from.  Are
there supposed to be different claims—liberty-claims, claim-right-claims, 
power-claims?  Or is the difference supposed to be grounded in the different 
strengths of claims?  If so, how?  Walen does not say.  Thus, the comparison 
to Newtonian mechanics does not really suggest itself as far as plausibility, 
clarity, and explanatory power are concerned. 
Now, let us look at why Walen thinks that self-defense against “just 
combatants” is impermissible.212 He subscribes to what he calls the “agent­
patient inference . . . [which] moves from the agent’s right to act to the agent’s 
right, qua patient, not to be interfered with.”213  Obviously, Walen is talking 
of liberty-rights or Hohfeldian privileges.  He concedes, however: “I do not 
think the agent–patient inference can be made whenever an agent has a right 
to act; sometimes other agents are permitted to try to interfere with an agent
doing what she has a right to try to do.”214 Actually, however, the insistence 
on trying is not necessary here: sometimes persons are permitted to actually
210. Comments from Alec Walen, Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School, to author
(Oct. 2016) (on file with author).
211.  Walen & Wasserman, supra note 209, at 551. 
212. He uses this term repeatedly in his papers.  E.g., Walen, supra note 208, at 416. 
I use the quotation marks because the combatants in my example might be justified, but 
they nevertheless act unjustly because they infringe the rights of innocent people. In fact, 
I find this whole talk about “just combatants” in this context question-begging if not tendentious. 
213. Id. at 383. 
214. Id.
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prevent someone from doing something permissible.  I give the example 
of the evil aliens from outer space who credibly threaten to destroy Earth 
and wipe out humanity unless Bill tries—yes, indeed—his best to kill Jane 
and her five kids.215  Under these circumstances, given what is at stake, it is
hard to deny that it is permissible for Bill to try his best to kill Jane and her
family.  However, if trying his best involves actually killing two members 
of her family, then he is permitted to do so.  In turn, it is obvious that Jill is 
permitted to resist Bill’s attempt to kill her and her family.  After all, if she
succeeds, then not only will the rest of humanity be saved—as long as Bill
tries his best—but in addition, other members of her family. In other
words, Bill is permitted to try to kill Jill and even to actually kill her to 
avoid the death of humanity, and Jill is permitted to try to kill Bill and 
even to actually kill him to include her own family in that part of humanity 
that will be saved by Bill’s action.  Thus, they are both justified in intervening
with the other’s permissible action.  Given this, one cannot rely on a general 
agent-patient inference to substantiate the claim that the civilians in the 
tactical bombers case may not defend themselves.
So, what argument does Walen actually have against my position?  I 
must admit: I have difficulties finding one.  While he accuses me of a “rather 
flat-footed understanding of rights as a given input into a situation—as 
though people simply have a right not to be killed and a right to engage in 
self-defense, unless that right is waived or forfeited,”216 he evidently does
not deem his own understanding of Walenian claims as a given input into
a situation flat-footed.  That is interesting.  Moreover, it is actually incoherent
to claim that I regard “rights as a given input into a situation”217 while
simultaneously admitting that on my account people can forfeit their rights. 
If they can forfeit them, they are hardly a given. 
Walen then, referring to his “Trolley Turners” example,218 states the
following:
If we assume the patient-claims of the five have been properly found to outweigh
the sidetrack man’s patient-claim on Brenda, then he has no right not to be killed
by her.  He does not have to forfeit any claims to lack a right not to be killed . . . .
 215. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 212.  Walen thinks this example involves “the gap between
intending and doing,” not between “doing and interfering with doing.” Comments from 
Alec Walen, supra note 210.  He misunderstands the example. 
216. Walen, supra note 208, at 407–08. 
217. Id. at 407. 
218. Id. at 396. 
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As for the right of self-defense, Steinhoff simply assumes the sidetrack man’s 
right of self-defense is unaffected by the context in which he acts. But how could
that be?  If he kills a justified actor like Brenda, then he kills someone for trying
to do what she had both a right and morally sufficient reason to do.  There is no
reason to think such responsive action is justified in this context—for reasons 
already spelled out.  The better view is that if the sidetrack man tries to defend
himself against Brenda, he would thereby act wrongly and thereby forfeit his
patient-claim not to be directly attacked in response.219 
My example is the tactical bomber example, not the sanitized Trolley 
Turners.220  So, allow me to leave Brenda on her tracks, where she belongs,
and to turn to what is actually at issue here.  Thus, first of all, to go up to the
persons who have been burned and mutilated in the justified attack of the 
bombers and tell them their rights actually have not been infringed at all, 
and that, given the circumstances, they simply had no right not to be burnt 
or mutilated in the first place, is in my view staggeringly counter-intuitive
and does not do justice either to the severity of the situation or to the moral
status of the victims of the allegedly just combatants.
Second, Walen claims I simply assume things, but he himself simply assumes 
the “just combatants” had a right to do what they did, including a right to
defend themselves against the civilians.221 But how can that be, given that
the civilians are entirely innocent and originally non-threatening while the 
combatants started the attack, threatening to kill and mutilate the innocent 
civilians? Is that irrelevant? 
Third, Walen also simply assumes the weighting of the Walenian claims 
will lead to the outcome he prefers—but he most certainly does not show
that.222  In fact, even if we accepted Walen’s claim that there is no such 
thing as a rights infringement and that the civilians have no claim-right
not to be attacked, this does not yet show that they have no liberty-right to
fight back. Walen himself, after all, cannot emphasize enough throughout 
his paper that people have a very strong claim against having to sacrifice
themselves for others.223 Thus, the sidetrack man in Trolley Turners is not 
obliged to sacrifice himself for the sake of others although the bystander
is still permitted to turn the trolley towards him—the sidetrack man—to 
save the five.224 To be sure, Walen at times seems to have a very narrow
understanding of sacrifice—it sometimes seems that on his account you 
are being sacrificed if you are being used—but there is no reason to go along 
219. Id. at 408 (footnote omitted). 
See generally id.
220.  Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 160. 
221.  Walen, supra note 208, at 416. 
222.   
223.  See id. at 282–84. 
224. Id. at 396. 
514
STEINHOFF (DO NOT DELETE) 9/13/2018 2:26 PM     
 
    
 












     
    
     
   
   
   
   
   
    






      
   
 
      
  




[VOL. 55:  469, 2018] Replies 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
with such a narrow understanding. What I say on McMahan also applies 
to Walen: 
[S]acrificing their lives is exactly what McMahan requires from the civilians.  He
does not require them to commit suicide, yes, but of course one can sacrifice one’s
life without committing suicide. If, for instance, someone asked me not to shoot
the tiger that is attacking me because if I did, the tiger could not go on to then
also kill the villain who otherwise would kill 20 innocent people, then, yes indeed, 
it seems that what I am being asked is to sacrifice my life for the benefit of these
other people.225 
No less pertinent is my reply to Victor Tadros.226  Some small changes
suffice, like replacing “interest” with “Walenian claim” and “means principle”
with “distinction between killing someone for the sake of others and requiring 
him to sacrifice himself for the sake of others”:
Thus, when Tadros asks: ‘What reason do we have to think that your interest
in your own life is insufficiently powerful to ground a prohibition on my killing 
you, but sufficiently powerful to ground a permission on your preventing me from
killing you?,’ the answer suggested by the normative reasoning underlying his
very own means principle is: ‘By killing me you do not require me to adopt your
goals, but by requiring me not to fight back you do.’227 
To these arguments Walen replies as follows: 
The problem with Steinhoff’s argument, however, is that he is insufficiently
attentive to the nature of the claims on the sidetrack man.  The five have claims
on him that he not interfere with their being saved.  If those were claims not to
allow them to die, then Steinhoff would be right: the sidetrack man would be sacrificing
himself for their sake.  But that is not the option he faces. He faces six negative claims: 
Brenda’s claim not to be killed and five claims not to have their saving interfered
with. He does not face the demand that he sacrifice himself for her or for them.228 
With due respect, this passage is biased, question-begging, and confused. 
Let me explain by referring to the tactical bomber.  First, Walen’s bias is 
obvious in that he posits that the bombers have a claim not to be killed 
and that the people the bombers want to save have a claim that their saving
 225. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 198; Uwe Steinhoff, The Liability of Justified Attackers, 
19 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 1015, 1025 (2016) [hereinafter Liability of Justified 
Attackers].
226. See VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL
LAW 205 (2011).
227. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 207–08 (citation omitted) (quoting TADROS, supra
note 226); Uwe Steinhoff, Why We Shouldn’t Reject Conflicts: A Critique of Tadros, 20 
RES PUBLICA 315, 321 (2014). 
228. Walen, supra note 208, at 408–09 (footnote omitted). 
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not to be interfered with but does not even mention here the innocent 
bystanders’ negative claims against the bomber that he not kill them nor 
their negative claims against the bomber’s beneficiaries that they not save
themselves by means that get the bystanders killed.  Thus Walen’s counting
of merely “six negative claims” is poor math.229  He also does not mention 
here that the bystanders have definitely done nothing to forfeit their right 
—or to weaken their “claim”—not to be killed or their right to self-defense.230 
In fact, the civilians literally do nothing that could possibly make them 
forfeit their right not to be killed or their right to self-defense—standing 
around does not qualify—while, on the other hand, threatening innocent 
and initially entirely non-threatening people with death and mutilation certainly 
counts as doing something. Indeed, it actually sounds like an immensely
plausible candidate for doing something by which one can forfeit one’s 
right—or very significantly weaken one’s “claim”—not to be attacked in
self-defense. 
Now, Walen of course claims the bystanders do not have a right not to 
be killed because this right is not produced by the “balance of claims.”231 
However, as I already pointed out above, he simply does not show that, 
nor does he show that the balance of claims produces a right of the bombers
not to be killed.  To repeat my question from above: “[h]ow can it be [that 
the bombers have a right not to be killed] given that the civilians are entirely 
innocent and originally non-threatening while the bombers started the 
attack, threatening to kill and mutilate the innocent civilians?  Is that
irrelevant?”232 Walen’s response to this question is, interestingly enough, 
that it is relevant.233 But if it is relevant, then the claims which the bombers 
have against the civilians are plausibly weaker than the claims of the
civilians against the bombers.  The same is true for the claims of the bomber’s
beneficiaries.  Why should they have a right that the bystanders not interfere 
with their being saved when they, the beneficiaries, unlike the bystanders,
induce others—intentionally or not—namely the bombers, to kill or mutilate
innocent people?  The beneficiaries are in fact the cause for the bystanders 
getting attacked, while the bystanders only respond to this threat.  In fact, 
should one’s claim to life not be stronger if it can be met without necessitating 
the killing and mutilation of innocent people?  It seems to me that one has 
to answer this question in the affirmative—unless one has, to use Walen’s 
229. Id. at 408. 
230. See generally id.  That is a major motif of my criticism of McMahan, and it is 
curious that Walen does not address this point. To be sure, Walen briefly mentions the point, 
id. at 407, but only to then ignore it. 
231. Id. at 405. 
232. See supra p. 514. 
233.  Comments from Alec Walen, supra note 210. 
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terminology, a rather flat-footed understanding of the nature and strength 
of claims.  Moreover, the survival of the bystanders only requires that the
bomber’s would-be beneficiaries are allowed to die, while the survival of
the bomber’s would-be beneficiaries requires that others are killed and thus, 
indeed, sacrificed so that they can live. But then, in the balance of claims,
the civilians should have a right not to be killed by the bombers while the 
bombers do not have a right not to be killed by the civilians. 
In addition, elsewhere Walen argues that claims are the weaker the more 
“restricting” they are, and vice versa.234 While Walen’s particular notion 
of a “restricting claim” and the use he makes of it are misguided,235 there
seems nevertheless to be some intuitive pull to the idea that, all else being 
equal, a claim is the stronger the less restricting it is for the options of other
people because then it imposes lesser costs on them.  But then it should
perhaps be noted—after all, Walen wants us to be “attentive to the nature 
of the claims” involved236—that a claim-claim is more restricting than a
liberty-claim.  To wit, the bystanders’ claim to the liberty to defend themselves 
leaves the beneficiaries of the bombers the options to induce the bombers 
to kill the bystanders for their benefit and also to do this killing themselves, 
and it leaves the bombers the option to kill the bystanders and to defend 
themselves against the defense of the bystanders.  In contrast, the beneficiaries’
claim that the bystanders not interfere with the bomber’s attempt to kill
the bystanders for the sake of the beneficiaries does not leave the bystanders
the option to defend themselves.  It only leaves them the option to die—which 
seems not to be much of an option anyway.  Thus, even if—or perhaps 
because—the more restricting claim-claim of the bystanders against the 
beneficiaries that the latter do not make others kill the former is outweighed
by the less restricting liberty-claim of the beneficiaries to make the bombers 
kill the bystanders, this does not show—on the contrary—that the less 
restricting liberty-claim of the bystanders to defend themselves does not, 
likewise, outweigh the more restricting claim-claim of the beneficiaries
against the bystanders that the latter not interfere with attempts to save the 
234. Alec Walen, Transcending the Means Principle, 33 L. & PHIL. 427 (2014).  See 
generally Alec Walen, The Restricting Claims Principle Revisited: Grounding the Means 
Principle on the Agent–Patient Divide, 35 L. & PHIL. 211 (2016). 
235. For an argument to this effect, see Uwe Steinhoff, Wild Goose Chase: Still No 
Rationales for the Doctrine of Double Effect and Related Principles, CRIM. L. & PHIL (Feb.
23, 2018), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11572-018-9456-y.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/YN9M-XNJQ].
236. Walen, supra note 208, at 408. 
 517



















    
 
 
        







former at the cost of the bystanders’ lives. Walen does not only not provide 
an answer to this problem, he does not even notice it. 
Thus, far from showing that the bomber has a right not to be killed, far 
from deriving that from a balance of claims, Walen actually just question­
beggingly assumes it. In fact, however, the balance of claims seems to suggest
exactly the opposite conclusion than the one Walen is intent on drawing. 
The confusion in Walen’s argument is apparent in the fact that he now
suggests that the violation of a negative claim that others do not interfere 
with one’s being saved excludes the possibility that such non-interference 
amounts to a sacrifice.  This suggestion is mistaken.237 
As already explained, by not defending themselves, the civilians would 
indeed sacrifice themselves for the sake of others.  To repeat my point 
from above: “If, for instance, someone asked me not to shoot the tiger that 
is attacking me because if I did, the tiger could not go on to then also kill
the villain who otherwise would kill 20 innocent people, then, yes indeed, 
it seems that what I am being asked is to sacrifice my life for the benefit 
of these other people.”238  And in fact, Walen agrees. He says this “is an 
instance of allowing yourself to be harmed for the sake of others,” and that
this is “like [his] Bomb case,” a case in which a person is not prohibited from
saving herself although by doing so she will cause the death of others.239 
But, of course, the tiger is exactly like the bombers in that neither the 
killed tiger nor the killed bombers can, being dead, then go on to save the 
innocent people from the villain(s).  Thus, if the people to be saved have
no claim against me that I allow myself to be eaten by the tiger, then, likewise,
the people to be saved by the bombers have no claim against the civilian 
bystanders that the latter allow themselves to be killed or mutilated by the 
bombers.  But then, there is simply no way that the balance of claims can 
give the bombers a right not to be killed by the civilians. 
Thus, it seems that it is in fact Walen who is “insufficiently attentive to
the nature of the claims” involved,240 while, conversely, it does not seem that
his mechanics of claims is, as he contends, “the better way to conceive of 
situations like” those described by the tactical bomber example.241  On the
contrary, if the “Infringement Model” is mistaken, as Walen claims, it is not 
even clear how his Mechanics of Claims can justify the bombing in the first
place.242  The civilians do nothing to forfeit their right to life, nor does the
237. Equally mistaken is to suggest in this context a difference between the beneficiaries’
claim that the bystanders “not interfere with their being saved” and their claim that they
“not [] allow them to die.”  Walen, supra note 208, at 408. 
238. See supra p. 515 
239.  Comments from Alec Walen, supra note 210. 
240. Walen, supra note 208, at 408. 
241. Id.
 242. See id. at 389. 
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balance of claims speak against them having such a right to start with. Thus, 
if there cannot be justified rights infringements, the civilians should not
be bombed at all.  Even if Walen’s mechanics of claims could establish that
it is justified to bomb the civilians, his framework would nevertheless be 
quite compatible with the permissibility of the civilians’ self-defense: the 
balance of claims would give the bombers at best a liberty to bomb the civilians,
but not a claim-right, that is, not a right not to be interfered with.  In fact, 
Walen’s position would actually imply the permissibility of the civilians’ 
self-defense against the bombers, as I have shown above in the context of
my arguments against McMahan and Tadros243—arguments that are equally 
applicable to Walen and which he has failed to refute.  After all, as Walen knows, 
“[a]gents . . . have a strong claim not to have to sacrifice themselves for 
others and an equally strong claim to be free to prevent themselves from
being sacrificed for others.”244  Then, however, the civilians should be permitted
to defend themselves against the bombers instead of being obliged to 
allow themselves to be killed or mutilated for the benefit of others. 
IX. REPLY TO MOORE
Michael S. Moore says his “main suggestion” to me is that I allegedly need
“to be less Hohfeldian in [my] conceptualization of rights, the right to self-
defense included.”245  He thinks, in conclusion, that I have 
no need to identify the right to self-defense that we each possess as a mere 
“liberty-right”—a naked permission or a naked liberty.  It can and should rather
be seen as a protected permission to defend oneself, a permission—whose correlative 
duty of the non-prevention by others—rules out the possibility of moral combat.246 
Well, first, I explicitly describe the normative structure of the self-defense
justification as one consisting of a liberty-right to defend oneself, a claim-
right against others not to interfere, and an agent-relative prerogative that
allows one to discount certain negative consequences of one’s act of self­
defense.247  It is true, however, that I argue that there are special situations
 243. See supra p. 515. 
244. Id. at 414. 
245. Michael S. Moore, Steinhoff and Self-Defense, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 315, 316
(2018).
246. Id. at 337–38 (footnote omitted). 
247. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 21–32.  For an earlier version of that section, see generally
Uwe Steinhoff, Self-Defense as Claim Right, Liberty, and Act-Specific Agent-Relative
Prerogative, 35 L. & PHIL. 193 (2016). 
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where a person might have a mere liberty to defend oneself without a claim-
right that others not interfere.  But such situations are then not covered by
the self-defense justification properly speaking, but by a justifying emergency 
or necessity justification. 
So, I do not think I should be less Hohfeldian in my conceptualization 
of rights; rather, I think Moore should be less Hurdian in his conceptualization
of permissions.  To wit, if one conceptualizes a permission in such a way
that it comes with a “correlative duty of non-prevention by others” and
thinks, as Moore seems to do, that a duty not to do X is incompatible with 
a permission to do X248—he rejects infringement—then one cannot even
coherently formulate a central concept of Moore’s analysis, a concept, 
moreover, he wants to hit me over the head with.  To wit, Moore claims: 
“Also seemingly possible is ‘weak moral combat,’ where at least one party 
has a moral right to prevent what another party has a moral right to do.”249 
Not so: if one adopts Moore’s definition of a “right” as a Hurdian “protected 
permission” then “weak moral combat” is not “seemingly possible”250 but
obviously conceptually impossible.  In fact, Moore himself admits that:
“For our analysis of active rights as protected permissions, when X has a 
right to do some action, A, it cannot be the case that there is weak moral
combat—that is, that others such as Y can equally have the right to prevent 
X from doing A.”251  In any case, one cannot answer substantive moral 
questions by offering stipulative definitions. 
Before coming to the actual heart of Moore’s criticism—which, I think, 
has much less to do with conceptual issues than Moore makes it sound— 
let me make some minor observations.  First, Moore quotes me as saying
that if a woman “has a claim-right towards B to do x, this means that B is
under a duty towards her, A, not to interfere with her doing x.”252  Commenting 
on this, he then states:
this is not how Hohfeld would analyze a claim-right to self-defense; there are no
such active claim-rights for Hohfeld.  And while Hohfeld would allow that there 
be a claim-right to non-interference in the woman’s doing of X, this would be contingent
and occasional, not an analytically necessary and universal accompaniment to the
women’s privilege to do X.253 
However, first, while it is indeed true that Hohfeld nowhere talks of claim-
rights to do something, many modern scholars—including myself—do and 
248. Moore, supra note 245, at 338. 
249.  Id. at 318. 
250. Id. at 338. 
251. Id. at 321. 
252. Id. at 8 (quoting Uwe Steinhoff, Rights, Liability, and the Moral Equality of 
Combatants, 16 J. ETHICS 339, 340 n.2 (2012) (emphasis omitted)). 
253. Moore, supra note 245, at 322. 
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mean by that, as noted, a claim-right against others that those others do not 
interfere with one’s action in question.254  Second, if such active claim rights
are rights against non-interference and Hohfeld actually does allow them, 
however contingently, than it is simply wrong that there are  no such active 
claim-rights for Hohfeld. 
Second, Moore claims that a certain analysis of the plank case “runs into 
trouble” because “neither mother is exercising a mere privilege when she 
places her child on the plank” but also an obligation.255  It is not entirely clear
where the trouble is supposed to come from.  Maybe Moore thinks it would 
be incoherent to ascribe to the mother both a mere privilege and an obligation. 
Fortunately, however, I am not doing that.  There is no such term as “mere
privilege” in Hohfeld’s terminology. There are privileges, though.  And they
are entirely compatible with obligations, so that a mother can have both 
the privilege and the obligation to place her child on the plank. That is exactly 
my entirely coherent position.  Or Moore thinks that the problem lies in there
being moral combat between the two mothers here.  As we will see, there 
is not.
Third, Moore says: “I take it that the intended payoff of Steinhoff adding
[an] ‘agent-specific agent-relative prerogative’ to liberty-rights and claim-
rights for a complete analysis of what it means to have an active right, is
to give him the results he desires about the cases considered in the text.”256 
Is that supposed to be a criticism?  I do not know.  However, I guess Moore’s
intended payoff of adding “strong permissions” to mere weak permissions 
in the case of self-defense is to get the results he desires.257  It seems,  
moreover, that we desire the same results: to outweigh the normal
consequentialist balance of evils in favor of self-defense. 
Let me now come to what I think are the actual three main criticisms 
that Moore offers against my account: (a) he thinks my analysis of the 
tactical bomber case is incoherent; (b) he thinks my analysis leads to 
“moral combat” and that this is undesirable and thus speaks against my account, 
and (c) that to the extent one tries to make sense of mutual liberties of 
people to fight each other, one should do so by stripping such situations
254. Thus, there is nothing particularly “idiosyncratic” about my terminology, pace
Moore, see id. at 328, in contrast to his own terminology, which is only used by Hurd and 
himself. 
255. Id. at 331. 
256. 
257. 
Moore, supra note 245, at 330 n.70. 
MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS,
AND METAPHYSICS 39–40 (2010). 
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of their moral dimensions.  In the following I shall argue that Moore is 
wrong on all three counts. 
Ad (a) Moore says: 
I . . . have little sympathy for Steinhoff when he says that the bombers “are at best 
justified, but that does not make them innocent in the relevant sense (namely in
the sense of not wronging others).”  This is on its face a contradiction; if the bombers
are justified . . . then they are at least permitted to bomb; if they are permitted to 
bomb, it cannot be the case that they are obligated not to bomb; unless they are 
obligated not to bomb, they do no wrong when they do bomb.258 
I have little sympathy for Moore imagining contradictions where none 
are to be found.  There simply is no contradiction.  Rather, there is a distinction
between doing wrong, that is, acting impermissibly all things considered,
and wronging someone, that is, violating or infringing his rights. There is
nothing “Pickwickian”259 about this sense of wronging. As Douglas Husak 
notes: “It is now widely accepted that judgments that IV’s [Innocent Victim’s]
act is permissible do not entail that WA [Wrongful Aggressor] is not wronged
by IV’s conduct.”260  Yes, it is, and it is also accepted by McMahan, whom
I am discussing in the section Moore is referring to here.  Thus, my claim is
that the bombers are engaged in an all-things-considered justifiable rights 
violation. They have a lesser evil justification for this rights violation.261 
Moore also claims that, “[b]y hypothesis, [the bombing] was the right
thing to do—that is, it was both justified and just.”262  Absolutely not. By
hypothesis the bombing was justified but unjust. As I state in the manuscript: 
“Moreover, [McMahan] explicitly defines ‘justified threateners’ [like the
tactical bombers] as ‘people who act with moral justification but whose 
justified action will wrong or infringe the rights of others—in this case,
 258. Moore, supra note 245, at 327. 
259. Id.
 260. Douglas Husak, The Vindication of Good over Evil: “Futile” Self-Defense, 55 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 291, 293 n.1 (2018); see also F. M. KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND PERMISSIBLE HARM 227–84, 466–68 (2007).  As Kamm nicely puts 
it: “[O]ne could wrong someone in the course of doing a right act.”  Id. at 488 n.19. 
261. In a footnote, Moore admits I am not “the only philosopher who uses these peculiar
locutions.”  Moore, supra note 245, at 328 n.55.  But he declares, “Yet it does nothing to 
advance the argument—that those like the villagers have both a right of self-defense and 
a right to compensation if they are bombed—to say that rights-infringements are ‘somewhat 
wrong’ and that only rights-violations are ‘really wrong.’” Id.  I do not think that it does 
anything to advance the argument to falsely give the impression that I use terms like somewhat
wrong and really wrong. Given that I, like so many others, believe in infringement—for
reasons that I make very clear in the manuscript—I simply distinguish between the violation of
Hohfeldian rights on the one hand and doing something wrong all things considered on 
the other.  I fail to see what is so difficult to understand about this distinction.
 262. Id. at 327. 
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the villagers’ right not to be killed.’”263  McMahan deems rights-infringements
as “unjust.”264  While Moore claims there is “no useful sense of wrong or unjust
here that does anything but confuse the issues,”265 one can easily avoid 
confusion by keeping unjust and justified as well as doing wrong and wronging
someone apart, as do both McMahan and I.
Moore, however, compounds the confusion by saying:
[Y]et the bombers, Steinhoff tells us, still have the right to defend themselves against
the civilians’ use of defensive force. 
. . . It looks like he comes out this way: the villagers’ right to use defensive 
force . . .  is only a naked, Hohfeldian liberty, not a protected permission—what 
Steinhoff idiosyncratically appears to call a “claim-right” to do something.  Likewise, 
the bombers . . . only have a naked liberty as well.266 
Actually, I do not tell anybody that the bombers have a right to defend 
themselves.  Rather, they have a lesser evil justification to do so, the same
justification that justified their mission in the first place.  Nor do they have
a Hohfeldian liberty—what Moore appears to call a “naked permission”267 
—to defend themselves.  Rather, the villagers have a Hohfeldian claim-right 
to life and a Hohfeldian claim-right that the bombers not interfere with
their defense against the bombing.  The bombers have a lesser evil justification 
to override both claim-rights but that does not give them a Hohfeldian liberty
to do so.  This account is logically and conceptually coherent. 
Ad (b) Moore claims: “Steinhoff touts self-defense rights as being such 
as to permit or require moral combat between persons.”268  Let us see: 
following Hurd, Moore defines moral combat as a situation were “one person’s 
moral success necessarily comes at the cost of another person’s moral failure,” 
and thinks only a malevolent god can create such morality.269  He elaborates: 
For example, each of two mothers, each of whom is obligated to save her own
child, seeks both to place her child on a plank that can only support one and to 
prevent the other mother from doing the same. While both mothers can fail in
their obligations—both children drown—at most only one can succeed in doing 
263. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 190 (quoting Jeff McMahan, Self-Defense Against 
Justified Threateners, in HOW WE FIGHT: ETHICS IN WAR 104, 107 (Helen Frowe & Gerald 
Lang eds., 2014)). 
264. Id. at 187 (quoting McMahan, supra note 263, at 114–15). 
Id. 
265.  Moore, supra note 245, at 327. 
266.  Id. at 328 (footnotes omitted). 
267.  at 337. 
268. Id. at 316. 
269. Id. at 317. 
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the two things she is obligated to do, which is to both save her child and prevent 
the other mother from saving hers.  This second game is almost as enjoyable to
the malevolent Greek god as the first, because collective success will elude the
humans in this game as certainly as it eludes an individual in the case of conflicting 
obligations being owed by one and the same individual.270 
No, it will not. Given that Moore is concerned about a morality being 
fair,271 one would think a benevolent god would accept ought implies can.272 
It is unfair to burden people with moral demands they cannot comply with.273 
Thus, a benevolent god would say that a duty of care—of mothers towards 
their children, doctors towards their patients, life-guards towards the 
swimmers—is a duty to do their best under the circumstances, but not a 
duty to actually succeed in their attempt to save those in their care.  After
all, if one of the mothers is simply the better fighter, the other mother cannot
save her child.  Thus, siding with more benevolent gods here and accepting 
ought implies can, I simply have to reject Moore’s unwarranted assumption 
that one of the fighting mothers will necessarily fail in her duties if the other 
succeeds. If both have done their best—in trying to save their child274— 
both succeed in fulfilling their duties. Moore’s morality, however, seems 
to condemn the two mothers to letting both of their children die.  Whose 
gods are more malevolent: mine or Moore’s? 
Moore tries to escape these objections.  He states:
 270. Id. (footnote omitted).  Incidentally, even if the two mothers had the obligation 
to save their own child and thus to do something that will, under the circumstances, prevent 
the other mother from saving hers, this is not the same as saying the mothers have the obligation 
to prevent the other mother from saving her child.  To wit, I might have the obligation to 
do something that will collaterally harm others, but that does certainly not mean I have the 
obligation to harm them. 
271. Id.
272. At least in the case of all-things-considered obligations—which we are talking
about now—not in the case of all Hohfeldian duties.  To wit, if I voluntarily acquire a 
Hohfeldian duty, for example by promise or contract, of which I know I might not be able 
to discharge it under certain foreseeable circumstances, then I cannot complain if those 
circumstances arise.  Moreover, as we saw, the breach of a Hohfeldian duty is not necessarily
wrong, that is immoral, although it leaves one indebted towards the person whose right 
one has infringed.  Thus, morality would be unfair by imposing all-things-considered obligations 
that cannot be discharged, but not by imposing some Hohfeldian duties that under certain
circumstances cannot be discharged. 
273. Again, morality does not always demand that a given Hohfeldian duty be discharged. 
There can be justified rights-infringements or it can be impossible to discharge a certain
Hohfeldian duty.  That does not mean that such duties are irrelevant.  Their infringement 
leaves a moral remainder and might have further moral consequences, for example, a duty
to compensation.
274. Or in trying to prevent the other mother from saving hers, although I do not think
there is such an obligation. See supra note 270. 
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Even if all obligations had as their content “tryings” rather than doings—which 
they do not . . . one mother’s obligation to try to prevent the other mother’s
success in her obligation to try to save her child would constitute strong moral 
combat, even though the definition of moral combat would shift a bit.  It would
be as gladiatorial and as unfair to obligate the person to try to undo what another
is obligated to try to do.  Gladiators who are obligated to try to kill one another,
and to try to prevent themselves from being killed, will fight just like gladiators
who are obligated both to kill one another and to prevent themselves from being 
killed.275 
First of all, I do not claim that all obligations have as their content tryings 
rather than doings.  I talk about duties of care above.  Moreover, given 
that, in the article Moore refers to, Heidi Hurd herself adduces an example
that is structurally similar to one half of my Kevin–Bob example to demonstrate 
exactly what I try to demonstrate—namely that sometimes trying to do X
can be justified while succeeding in doing X would not be justified276—I 
wonder how one could then possibly claim that it cannot also be the case 
that sometimes trying to do X is obligatory while actually succeeding in 
doing X is not. Whence the mysterious difference?  Hurd does not explain,
nor does Moore. 
Second, Moore defines “strong moral combat” as “situations where at 
least one party is obligated to prevent another party from doing what would 
satisfy that other party’s obligation.”277  Unfortunately for him, “one mother’s
obligation to try to prevent the other mother’s success in her obligation to 
try to save her child”278 would not constitute strong moral combat because
it is entirely possible for both mothers to simultaneously try to keep the other 
mother from trying.  For example, they can try to knock the other mother 
out before she even has the idea to get to the floating plank but fail to actually
knock her out.  Moreover, here as there the principle ought implies can
applies: if it is impossible for one of the mothers to try to keep the other
mother from trying—as it would be when the first mother knows that the 
other mother has already started trying—then she does not have an obligation 
to try to keep the other mother from trying.  Thus, either way, there is no moral
combat. 
275. Moore, supra note 245, at 318 n.21. 
276. Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World is Wrong?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 157, 
192–93 (1994). The other half of my example is of course the comparison between Kevin
and Bob, which helps to undermine a position Hurd defends, namely objectivism.
277. Moore, supra note 245, at 318. 
278. Id. at 318 n.21. 
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Third, even if it were “unfair to obligate the person to try to undo what
another is obligated to try to do,”279 it still would not be moral combat, as
we just saw. Of course, Moore might want to “shift” the “definition of moral
combat . . . a bit,”280 but as I said above, stipulative definitions do not amount 
to a substantive moral argument.  Moreover, while a morality that ignores 
the ought implies can principle—as Moore’s morality seems to do—is indeed
unfair, a morality that demands of all people the same and does not demand
more than they can do is not unfair. There is nothing unfair in two boxers 
being obliged to try to knock the other out.  Nor is there anything unfair 
in two mothers being obligated to try to save their own child, even if doing 
so would mean that the other child dies. 
As regards Moore’s morality apparently condemning both children to 
die—which is also not unfair, but it would certainly be irrational—Moore 
first suggests the “almost dead” exception as an escape route.281  He then
seems to admit that this exception does not apply “in this version of the 
plank case,”282 but then nevertheless claims that it “does apply.”283  I find 
this back and forth suspicious and rather unconvincing.  In any case, his
supposed solution is this: 
When both children are about to drown (t3), each mother’s obligations— to save and
to thwart—cease and they are nakedly at liberty at t3 to throw off the other child,
throw off their own child, and to prevent the other from throwing off either child.
To be sure, such a moral state of nature may yet result in both infants’ deaths—
if the two mothers cannot work out some accommodation—but at least morality
does not require that no such accommodation be reached—and that both infants
must therefore die.
Notice that at t3 there is no moral combat—at least no more than at t1 and t2— 
and Hurd’s alternative logic of rights—ruling it out—is secure in such cases.284 
In other words, while it originally seemed that Moore’s morality obliges the 
mothers to let both their children drown, now the mothers’ obligations to 
save their children—poof!—just evaporate. They can kill the other child, 
they can kill their own child—who cares?  Certainly not Moore’s god. Thus, 
theologically speaking, Moore faces the problem that his god is either cruelly
condemning both children to die or he is cowardly fleeing the scene.  But, 
at least “Hurd’s alternative logic” is “secure.”285  Need I say that I find the god 
suggested by my account vastly superior to the god suggested by Moore’s? 
279. Id.
 280. Id.
 281. Id. at 332. 
282. Id.
 283. Id. at 333. 
284. Id.
 285. Id. 
526
STEINHOFF (DO NOT DELETE) 9/13/2018 2:26 PM     
 














     








       
     
 
    
  
        
 
 
[VOL. 55:  469, 2018] Replies 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Moving on, recall Moore’s definition of weak moral combat, “where at 
least one party has a moral right to prevent what another party has a moral
right to do.”286  It should be obvious that on this definition weak moral
combat relates to moral combat as defined above as square-headed, round­
headed paper tigers relate to tigers.  Given that, as I already explained above,
weak moral combat as defined here by Moore is logically impossible— 
due to Moore’s Hurdian definition of a right as a “protected permission”287 
—it can hardly be a kind of moral combat, for moral combat as defined
above is logically possible.  In any case, it is certainly not worthwhile to
conduct philosophical debates in terms of incoherent concepts. 
Luckily, elsewhere Moore, together with Hurd, provides an implicit
definition of weak moral combat that has at least the advantage of not 
being incoherent.  They provide this as an example: “[T]wo men on a
plank that can only support one are permitted to throw the other off to his 
death in Hohfeld’s sense of ‘privilege,’ viz, one does not wrong in doing
so . . . . Since each has such a permission, each is morally permitted to 
engage in active combat.”288  But still, now it should be obvious that on 
this definition weak moral combat relates to moral combat as defined
above as paper tigers relate to tigers.  A paper tiger is no tiger at all. If both 
parties are permitted to do what they are doing, then they can hardly fail 
in their moral obligations.289 Moreover, as we just saw in the plank case
with children, Moore has absolutely no problem with all parties being 
privileged, that is having naked liberties, to kill each other. So even if my
account implied the existence of weak moral combat—what is the complaint? 
After all, as we saw in the last indented quote, Moore himself proposes
weak moral combat in this sense as a solution to his own problems.  If he is
happy to embrace it, why should I not be? 
286. Id. at 318. 
287. Id. at 320. 
288. Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Moral Combat and the Hohfeldian Analysis of
Active Rights, in THE LEGACY OF WESLEY HOHFELD:EDITED MAJORWORKS,SELECT PERSONAL
PAPERS, AND ORIGINAL COMMENTARIES (Shyam Balganesh, Ted Sichelman & Henry Smith
eds., forthcoming 2018).  My objections to Hurd’s and Moore’s position are by and large also
applicable to their line of reasoning in this text. 
289. Of course, on my account—but evidently not on Moore’s—one can be permitted in 
infringing one’s Hohfeldian duty towards another person on grounds of a lesser evil justification, 
but such an infringement would not be immoral, and it is immorality that is at issue when 
Moore talks about moral failure. 
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Thus, to summarize: First, if one accepts ought implies can, Hurd’s “moral
combat”290 seems to become a non-issue—it simply cannot exist.  Second,
it is conceptually impossible that weak moral combat is moral combat.  Even 
more, depending on which definition we go with, weak moral combat is 
either an incoherent concept and thus worthless or it refers to something 
that even on Moore’s own account is unproblematic.  Thus, Moore’s argument 
that my account implies a problematic form of moral combat, and is therefore
to be rejected, collapses. There is no such moral combat in my account. 
Ad (c) Even if the two mothers fighting for the plank—or the tactical 
bombers and the civilians fighting against each other—are not situations 
of moral combat, that is, situations that tragically condemn one of the parties
to fail in their moral obligations, the mutual justification of both parties to 
fight each other could perhaps still be ruled out on independent moral
grounds.  However, neither Hurd nor Moore provide such independent moral 
grounds.  In fact, two boxers simply are morally permitted to fight each 
other. Moreover, Moore confesses: “If I can locate and defuse a nuclear device
at 42nd street only by torturing the innocent child of the terrorist who planted
it there, I torture.”291  Yet, if two mothers could save their children and 
millions of New Yorkers from this nuclear device by either torturing a child 
or by fighting each other, then they certainly should do the latter instead 
of torturing the innocent child.  Thus, there clearly are possible cases—even 
outside of sports events and situations of mutual consent—where one 
person is justified in fighting another while the other is also justified in fighting 
back, and these situations are cases of genuine moral justification. 
Consequently, the attempt to relegate such situations to the realm of the 
amoral fail. Hurd, for example, admits that Hohfeldian privileges or liberty- 
rights make it possible that one person has the liberty to do X while another
person has the liberty to prevent him from doing X, and then simply dismisses 
this real moral possibility by claiming that “Hohfeldian liberties define 
amoral actions.”292  Moore follows her in this assessment, compares the
absence of a moral duty not to kill another person with the absence of a duty 
not to rub one’s eyes, and declares that “[a]n absence of a duty and an absence 
of its correlative claim-right do not make for a kind of moral thing, no more
than putting positive sounding labels on absent elephants . . . would transform 
such absences into kinds of elephants.”293 
First, Moore is comparing apples and oranges here.  Liberty rights are 
indeed not moral things in the way elephants are physical things, which, 
290. Moore, supra note 245, at 318. 
291. Michael S. Moore, Patrolling the Borders of Consequentialist Justifications: The
Scope of Agent-Relative Restrictions, 27 L. & PHIL. 35, 44 (2008). 
292. HURD, supra note 199, at 281. 
293. Moore, supra note 245, at 336. 
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however, is simply due to the fact that liberty rights are relations. So, let 
us use the right analogy here: just as the absence of the as-big-as-relation
between two existing elephants means the presence of a smaller-than-relation
between them, so the absence of a duty-relation between two existing persons
means the presence of a liberty-relation between them. Such a relation, like 
all relations, is not nothing, but something.  Accordingly, the presence of
a liberty-relation is morally as relevant as the presence of a smaller-than­
relation is physically; and it is particularly bizarre to claim that a liberty 
to kill another person is morally as insignificant as the absence of a duty 
to rub one’s eyes.  In fact, Hurd herself states that acts of self-defense—and I
would assume of killing—“appear to be of moral significance.”294  Yes, 
they do.  And I claim the two persons in Nozick’s falling man example have
both a liberty and a permission—in my sense—to kill each other, where
the permission is partly explained precisely by the liberty.  “A plausible
moral theory,” says Hurd, “at least speaks to the question of self-defense.”295 
Mine does. 
I conclude that Moore’s critique of my position is unsuccessful: my
position is neither inconsistent, nor does it imply moral combat, nor is it
amoral. Moreover, it is attuned to moral intuitions whose “tug” Moore 
admits feeling himself but then unfortunately feels obliged to deny on the 
basis of his unwarranted belief that moral combat cannot be escaped
otherwise.296  As I showed, it can. If ought implies can, moral combat seems 
not even to be an issue.  At the very least, it is not a problem for my account. 
X. REPLY TO BAZARGAN-FORWARD
To fully understand the debate between Saba Bazargan-Forward and me, 
the reader will probably need to know both Bazargan-Forward’s article 
and my criticism of his views.297  For reasons of space and to avoid duplication, 
I will proceed assuming the reader is acquainted with both.
In response to my critique, Bazargan-Forward claims “it is not a consequence 
of [his] view that violating a right to ten dollars can diminish the wrongdoer’s 
294. HURD, supra note 199, at 281. 
295. Id.
 296. Moore, supra note 245, at 335. 
297. See generally Saba Bazargan, Killing Minimally Responsible Threats, 125 ETHICS
114 (2014) [hereinafter Killing Minimally Responsible Threats].  For my critique, see Uwe
Steinhoff, Against a “Combined Liability-Lesser-Evil Justification,” PHILOSOPHIA (June
24, 2018), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11406-018-9992-7.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/ZP8P-8ZZW].
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right not to be
ability
 killed.”
” he writes: 
298  Yes, it is.  Under the heading of “The Complex 
If P is at least minimally responsible for an objectively unjust harm which she will 
impose on Q unless we preemptively harm P, then P is liable for no more than n 
percent of the unjust harm for which she is responsible, where n is equal to the 
percent moral responsibility she bears for that unjust harm.299 
However, first, to violate, as a responsible agent, someone’s right to $10
is to be morally responsible for an objectively unjust harm, just like killing 
someone unjustly but as a responsible agent is to be responsible for an
objectively unjust harm.  Accordingly, the unjustly harming agent will become 
liable to harm herself, and this is all that is needed to trigger Bazargan­
Forward’s “Lesser Evil Discounting View.”300  Moreover, Bazargan-Forward 
explicitly says: “I am assuming that harms can be measured on a single
dimension yielding an interval measure of their moral significance.”301 
Such a formulation hardly suggests any appeal to thresholds,302 so I think 
I got the consequences of his account exactly right. 
Bazargan-Forward also states in further support of his claim that I got 
the consequences of his account wrong:
After all, a right to property and a right not to be killed can indeed be construed
as entirely different rights.  But it’s much more difficult to say the same of ‘the
rights not to be killed’ and ‘the right we have not [to] be maimed.’  They’re quite
similar. (Indeed, they might be grounded in the same right to continued physical 
integrity).303 
Actually, they cannot only be construed as entirely different, they are
different, which is shown in the fact that you can violate someone’s right 
not to be maimed—for example, by cutting off his arm—without thereby also
violating his right not to be killed. That would, for obvious logical reasons, 
hardly be possible if they were the same right.  Indeed, the right not to be 
killed, the right not to be maimed, and the right not to be stolen from “might
be grounded” in the same right not to be harmed.304  Thus, by that logic, the 
298. Saba Bazargan-Forward, Commentary on Uwe Steinhoff’s “Just War Theory: 
Self-Defense, Necessity, and the Ethics of Armed Conflicts” 1 (2016) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the author). 
299. Id.
 300. Id.
 301. Minimally Responsible Threats, supra note 297, at 122. 
 302.  The idea to appeal to thresholds was flaunted during discussion.  Yet, as we will 
see, that idea does not help either: if the threshold is, for example, losing a right to one’s 
finger, or even one’s arm, the fact still remains that a right to one’s arm is not the same as
the right to one’s life, and therefore it is unclear why losing the former should diminish
the stringency of the latter. 
303. Bazargan-Forward, supra note 298. 
304. Id.
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right not to be stolen from is also “quite similar” to the right not to be killed.305 
In fact, in the paper under discussion, Bazargan-Forward mentions the “right
not to be harmed” three times.306  It thus seems to be of some importance.
Bazargan-Forward asks—apparently rhetorically—whether I “think that 
the right against the loss of an arm is a ‘different right’ than a right against
the loss of a leg?”307 Yes, I most definitely think that—who does not? If I
tell the doctor regarding the threatening gangrene: “Look, I hereby allow 
you to amputate my arm, but hands off of my leg, I’m warning you,” and
the doctor, perhaps after having read Bazargan-Forward, decides, “Oh, what
the heck, the right to an arm is similar to the right to a leg, so I can just as
well amputate the leg instead of the arm,” then I can kill the doctor in self-
defense, if necessary.  This strongly suggests to me that the right to an arm 
and the right to a leg are different rights—you do not waive one by waiving
the other, nor do you forfeit one by forfeiting the other. 
Bazargan-Forward, however, indeed contends: 
It’s crazy-sauce for a wrongdoer to claim “Yes, I’ve forfeited my right against 
the loss of my arm, but as it turns out, the only way to stop me is to deprive me 
of my leg—and that’s a completely different right, which means you can’t discount 
the loss of my leg in your proportionality calculation!”  I think it’s similarly 
crazy-sauce for the wrongdoer to make an analogous claim about the right against 
the loss of his leg and the right against the loss of his life.  If you lose the former
right, and the only way to stop you is by depriving you of the latter, we are entitled
to discount the disvalue of the latter loss (which doesn’t necessarily permit inflicting 
that loss).308 
No, we are not.  In my amputation example, I did lose my right against
my arm being amputated—I lost it by waiving it.  And it is just crazy-sauce, 
to use Bazargan-Forward’s expression, to claim that—due to the loss of the
right to my arm—my right to my leg has become less stringent, so that the 
doctor can now more easily amputate it on grounds of a lesser evil justification 
—perhaps to cook one of Peter Unger’s soups to save the poor.
Bazargan-Forward’s talk about wrongdoers is therefore potentially
misleading. When we hear that expression, we automatically think of culpable 
wrongdoers. In my manuscript, I have explicitly stressed that their interests 
can be discounted and that their rights might become less stringent; but, I 
have also made clear that this has to do precisely with their culpability, 
305. Id. What is good for the goose is good for the gander. 
306. Minimally Responsible Threats, supra note 297, at 119, 126. 
307. Bazargan-Forward, supra note 298, at 2.
 308. Id.
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not with their liability.309  Now, of course, by using the term wrongdoers, 
Bazargan-Forward might also mean people who are merely responsible
for wrongful action, without being culpable for it.  But again, even if their 
rights lose something in stringency and their interests can be discounted— 
this does not establish that this has anything to do with liability.  Their right 
to their leg is not less stringent because they are liable to lose an arm, but 
—if at all—because they are morally responsible for a threat of unjust harm.
And in fact, Bazargan-Forward himself concedes that now.310  But then his
“Response to [the] First Criticism”311 collapses, and it remains true that one’s
right to one’s leg does not become less stringent only because one has lost 
one’s right to one’s arm. Liability as such has nothing to do with the discount. 
Although Bazargan finally actually admits this, he at first nevertheless 
attempts to undermine my point that liability has nothing to do with the 
discount. He says: “Suppose the MRT [minimally responsible threatener] 
is liable to a broken arm.  But we can only inflict two broken arms on him.
We can discount the harm of inflicting two broken arms, because the MRT 
is already liable to half of that.  It’s as simple as this.”312 
No, it is not. Bazargan-Forward is at times confused by his own use of 
the word discount. This is one such occasion, and Bazargan-Forward runs 
things together that need to be kept apart.  To wit, I always carefully distinguish 
between subtraction on the one hand and discount on the other.  On 
Bazargan-Forward’s account, the harm to which an MRT is liable can be 
subtracted—my word, he talks of that harm being “for free”—from the
amount of harm necessary to stop the MRT and the harm remaining after 
the subtraction is the one that can—according to Bazargan-Forward—be
discounted in the lesser evil justification.313  Thus, if the discount is the 
discount referred to in Bazargan-Forward’s formulation of the “The Lesser-
Evil Discounting View,” then it is misleading to talk about discounting “the 
harm of inflicting two broken arms.”314  Rather, the harm of one broken arm
is to be subtracted from the harm that still needs to be justified by the lesser 
evil justification—the harm to the second arm—and it is that harm that is 
to be discounted.315  And the question as to why that harm can be discounted
leads us right back to my first criticism, which, as we saw, remains unrefuted. 
Let me now come to Bazargan-Forward’s admission, which I already 
mentioned. To wit, I pointed out: “[R]emarkably, his own explanation as
 309. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 218–19. 
310.  Bazargan-Forward, supra note 298. 
311.  Id. 
 312. Id. at 2. 
313. Id. at 2–3. 
314. Id. at 1–2; see also Minimally Responsible Threats, supra note 297, at 127. 
315.  Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 221–22. 
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to why harm inflicted on the MRT can be discounted, thus opening the 
way for a lesser evil justification, entirely omits any reference to liability but 
instead exclusively focuses on responsibility.”316  Bazargan-Forward replies:
It’s true that I neglect to mention liability in my characterization of the ‘hybrid
justification.’  But what’s crucial in the hybrid justification is the bearing of some 
moral responsibility for an unjust threat. Whether we call that ‘liability’ (which
is determined in part by whether we think necessity is internal to it) doesn’t matter
for the sake of my main thesis. What’s being ‘hybrid-ized’ (or ‘combined’) with
the lesser evil justification is the kind of justification derived from one’s moral
responsibility for an unjust threat.317 
Well, it does not matter what we call it, but it certainly matters what it 
is. Moral responsibility is not liability.  That does matter for Bazargan­
Forward’s original thesis that we need a combined liability/lesser evil 
account; a thesis he seems rightly to be willing to give up now in light of my
criticism.  Moreover, there simply is no combination.  That evils and goods, 
rights and interests, have to be weighed—which might, of course, involve 
discounting—is simply part and parcel of the lesser evil justification.
Accordingly, Bazargan-Forward’s proposal would at best be one more 
interpretation or version of the lesser evil justification, not some kind of
exciting new combined justification. 
Bazargan-Forward also says: 
So it might be correct that I should have focused on responsibility rather than 
liability—but that doesn’t undermine the basic claim I’m making: if you’re
minimally responsible for an unjust killing, the fact that you are merely minimally
responsible suggests that we can impose only a little bit of defensive harm on
you; if it turns out that the only way to stop that unjust killing is by imposing more
than that little bit, we can accordingly discount that great harm (in the way specified 
by what I call the ‘complex account’).318 
This certainly was not the basic claim Bazargan-Forward made in the 
original paper. His claim there was more ambitious.  Moreover, what does 
undermine Bazargan-Forward’s new basic claim is my discussion of
McMahan’s “combined justification.”319  Bazargan-Forward has not responded
to my examples although they clearly affect his position as much as 
McMahan’s. 
316.  Id. at 223. 
317.  Bazargan-Forward, supra note 298, at 3. 
318.  Id. 
 319.  Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 217, and especially the examples provided at 214–19. 































I also argue that Bazargan-Forward’s account renders the wrong results. 
I try to show this with a rather—necessarily—complicated version of the
mistaken resident case.320  Bazargan answers that I am only reporting my
intuitions here, and that I try to argue that “moral luck” is irrelevant.321 
Actually, I nowhere deny that moral luck is relevant.  Rather, I argue that
the specific difference that Bazargan-Forward’s account makes capable of 
morally deciding between life and death is in fact morally entirely irrelevant.322 
If Bazargan-Forward does not share my intuitions in this case, so be it.
Those, however, who do share my intuitions are well advised to reject his
account. 
Yet, Bazargan-Forward states:
[S]uppose that moral luck is indeed morally irrelevant and that the lesser evil 
discounting view is not victim-relative in the way I suggested above.  In that case, 
we can repair to the relevance of responsibility rather than liability—since both
D1 and D2 are minimally responsible threateners, either of them can be permissib[ly]
killed in accordance with the hybrid justification for killing MRTs.323 
Of course, repairing “to the relevance of responsibility rather than liability”
precisely concedes my point that liability has nothing to do with it, which 
the example was supposed to show.324 Conceding my point is hardly a way 
of refuting it. Moreover, the examples I adduce against McMahan’s “combined 
justification”325 show that responsibility will not do the job either.
A further example I use is yet another variation of the mistaken resident 
case. In this variation, the mistaken resident is a surgeon about to operate
the next morning on an innocent patient who will die if the killer’s innocent 
twin shoots the surgeon in self-defense. I point out that on Bazargan-Forward’s 
account the innocent twin must not shoot the surgeon, and that this is entirely 
implausible and counter-intuitive—both morally and legally.326  Bazargan-
Forward bites the bullet and states:
I consider it a strength of the account that it does not permit defensive violence in
this case.  Agents cannot ignore the consequences of their actions—including the
consequences of otherwise permissible self-defense.  To claim otherwise is to suggest 














ample, so I will not rep













321.  Bazargan-Forward, supra note 298, at 4. 
 322.  And yes, I do think my example shows that. 
323.  Id. at 4. 
324.  Id. 
 325.  Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 217. 
326.  Id. at 224–25. 
327.  Bazargan-Forward, supra note 298, at 5. 
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Actually, I do not say that agents can ignore the consequences of their actions. 
I do want to say, however, that they must not be enslaved by consequentialism.
Individuals have rights and prerogatives, to claim otherwise is to abandon 
liberalism for a kind of moral socialism, where one becomes the mere serf
of other people’s interests. To wit, if one must not shoot the surgeon if this
would cost the life of still one other person and because one cannot ignore 
the consequences, then it is difficult to see why this should be different with
a fully culpable surgeon who tries to kill or rape you.  Does Bazargan-Forward
want to suggest that a woman must not kill a surgeon who is about to rape 
her if then the surgeon would fail to save two other people tomorrow? Must
she sacrifice herself?  I would not think so, nor does any Western jurisdiction.328 
I will not be able to talk Bazargan-Forward out of his intuitions, of course,
but I console myself thinking that few would be inclined to follow him.
Finally, I point out that “contrary to what Bazargan claims, it is not
intuitive at all that the MRT (or her estate) in Mistaken Resident is owed any
compensation.”329  Bazargan-Forward replies: “I for one think that because
the mistaken resident is acting non-culpably, she is not liable to be killed.
Since she is not liable to be killed, killing her wrongs her.  Since she is wronged, 
she is owed compensation.  Q.E.D.”330 
Quod erat demonstrandum?  While I appealed to our intuitions—which
might not include Bazargan-Forward’s intuitions, but which are certainly 
intuitions expressed by many if not all Western jurisdictions—and from 
there concluded that the resident is liable, Bazargan-Forward stipulates 
that the resident is not liable and then conveniently infers he must be owed
compensation.  That is not a demonstration but a mere claim.  Moreover, 
Bazargan-Forward thinks the resident is at least liable to some harm331— 
so he is only haggling over the price.  And indeed, why should an MRT 
not be liable to be killed?  If an MRT threatening one innocent person is liable
to some harm, why should an MRT threatening a genocide not be liable to be
killed?  Where is the threshold?  Again, we are haggling over price.  Moreover, 
given that above Bazargan-Forward endorsed moral luck—and particularly 
moral bad luck—why should bad luck not be sufficient to make the resident 
liable to be killed?332  Be that as it may, again I will not be able to talk
328. The self-defense justification works in Western jurisdictions as a prerogative—
in my terminology.
329. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 226 (footnote omitted).
330. Bazargan-Forward, supra note 298, at 5.
 331. Minimally Responsible Threats, supra note 297, at 115. 
332.  By the way, I am not a luck egalitarian!
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ward out of his intuitions, but again I think few will share 
XI. QUESTIONS TO HUSAK
I do not really have a reply to Douglas Husak’s paper, not least because 
it seems his account is compatible with mine.  So, I content myself here with 
merely raising two questions.  He says: 
My own rough approximation is that the futile force exerted against WA [wrongful 
attacker] by IV [innocent victim] implements, realizes, or instantiates the principle
that good should not capitulate—or yield—to evil. I suggest implementation of
this principle constitutes a great part of the good that justifies IV’s act.  If we insist on
expressing the implementation of this principle in terms of value, we should say
that a world in which this principle is instantiated is a world that contains more
value than a world in which it is not.333 
He considers the value produced by such futile self-defense to be “impersonal
value.”334 
First, if the principle is that good should not capitulate to evil, this seems
to imply a duty of self-defense—and also of other-defense, for that matter.
In fact, the appeal to impersonal value might already imply this—depending
on the moral background theory, which would have to be spelled out more 
clearly.  Does Husak agree, and if so, is he fine with these implications? 
Second, what if by engaging in futile self-defense against Bill, Clarice 
somehow, as a foreseen side-effect, facilitates Joe’s wrongful attack on 
Carlos—Joe is invigorated by seeing Clarice struggle against Bill? It would 
appear that, if the attack on Carlos is the greater wrong, Clarice would have 
to desist from futile self-defense against Bill on Husak’s account—but not 
on mine; or at least Husak’s account would not justify it, which would speak 
against his account.
Obviously, I raised these questions during the conference, but I am still
not entirely clear on the answer.  I understood Husak as saying more work 
needs to be done here.  Fair enough.
XII. A NOTE ON SIMONS
There also does not appear to be too much disagreement between me and 
Simons, so I do not have a reply here, either. Rather, I thank Simons for 
the hint that I should say more on the distinction between private and public 
necessity.  This distinction is to be found in American law, but there is no
 333. Husak, supra note 260, at 305 (footnote omitted). 
334. Id. at 309 (emphasis added). 
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equivalent in German law.335 I will indeed fill this gap in the revised version
of the manuscript.  However, luckily for me, this distinction does not affect 
my argument.  In fact, Simons states: “I find persuasive Steinhoff’s argument 
that the potential collateral victims of the tactical bomber are owed compensation
but at the same time are entitled to use defensive force to protect themselves
from harm.”336 
Simons also notes there is a dearth of case law—and thus a lack of clarity 
—on the question of whether someone whose personal rights—as opposed to
property rights—are being justifiably infringed is owed compensation.337 
I think, however, that given the law’s stance on compensation for the 
infringement of property rights, it would be downright inconsistent to deny
such a right to compensation in the case of liberty rights.  As Simons notes 
himself: “On first impression, it seems indefensible that a person’s interest
in obtaining compensation for a potentially serious personal injury would 
receive less legal protection than a person’s interest in compensation for 
infringement of a mere property interest.”338  But he adds: 
However, I believe an American court faced with such a case would be justifiably 
cautious before awarding full compensatory damages, in light of the potential 
magnitude of such an award, and the risk that the prospect of having to pay such
an award would deter private actors from doing what they otherwise reasonably
believed necessary to save themselves from harm—as in the escape-from-an-assailant 
case. . . . But imagine a future world in which providing full compensation for a 
serious personal injury were much less burdensome.  Imagine that the restorative
power of medicine improved to such a degree that no one ever died from traumatic 
injuries, and all such injuries could be promptly cured at modest cost.  In such a 
world, I believe it would be incumbent on justified injurers to ensure that their victims 














































































































































































































































































































337.  Id. at 362. 
338.  Id. at 372–73. 
339.  Id. at 373. 








    
 




















Note that this idea of an insurance scheme is exactly the same as McMahan’s 
idea of a “burden-sharing scheme.”340  I discuss this under the suggestive
heading, Who “Should” Compensate?—and Why That Does Not Matter.”341 
To wit, it does not matter for the question whether the rights infringer has 
a Hohfeldian duty to compensate toward the victim of the infringement.  I
state:
[W]hat if the passerby does not have enough money, what if he is really poor, and
taking his money for the insulin would impose an unreasonable hardship on him?
In that case, I submit, perhaps neither the state nor the owner should insist that 
the passerby compensate the owner. But, again, this does not mean that he has no duty 
to compensate, that he is not liable to pay compensation.  Out of beneficence or compassion
the owner should not insist on his right . . . but, conversely, the passerby should at least 
apologize to the owner: “Look, I am really sorry, but I can’t pay for the damages I
unjustly inflicted on you.”  This confirms that he is not released of his duty towards 
the owner (unless the owner releases him himself), even if, all things considered, 
one should not make him pay out of compassion and mercy.342 
Thus, that a “court faced with such a case would be justifiably cautious
before awarding full compensatory damages”343 does not mean that the
rights infringer does not owe the victim a moral Hohfeldian duty of compensation,
a moral duty that the law should somehow acknowledge, even if, all things
considered, the legally enforceable compensation should be capped at some
point or, in cases of extreme hardship, not be enforced at all.  Simons’s
belief that “it would be incumbent on justified injurers to ensure that their 
victims obtained . . . a cure” if the cure’s costs were not exorbitant is—as 
far as I can see—completely in line with this position.344  It does certainly 
not contradict it. 
340. McMahan, supra note 263, at 119–20.
 341. Steinhoff, supra note 4, at 200–02. 
342. Id. at 201–02. See generally Liability of Justified Attackers, supra note 225. 
343. Simons, supra note 336, at 373. 
344. Id. at 373. 
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